The Difference Between the Russian Language and the Russian State Does Not Exist in the Ukrainian Language
Received: 04.03.2024
The official reply from Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture reveals a fundamental linguistic issue: the Ukrainian language does not differentiate between the Russian words “russkiy” (ethnic Russian or Russian-language) and “rossiyskiy” (related to the Russian Federation as a state).
In the Russian language, these two terms have completely different meanings.
“Russkiy” refers to the Russian people as an ethnic group, to cultural identity, or to the language itself — for example, russkiy yazyk (Russian language), russkaya kul’tura (Russian culture), russkiy narod (the Russian people).
“Rossiyskiy” refers to the modern political-legal identity of the Russian Federation — such as rossiyskiy pasport (passport of the Russian Federation), rossiyskaya armiya (Russian state army), or rossiyskoye zakonodatel’stvo(legislation of the Russian Federation).
So in Russian, a person can clearly distinguish between:
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“He is ethnically Russian, but not a citizen of Russia.”
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“She has Russian Federation citizenship, but she is Tatar by nationality.”
In Ukrainian, however, both “russkiy” and “rossiyskiy” are translated using the same word: “rosiiskyi.”
For example:
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russkiy yazyk → rosiiska mova
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rossiyskiy yazyk → rosiiska mova
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russkaya kul’tura → rosiiska kultura
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rossiyskaya armiya → rosiiska armiia
This linguistic merging erases the conceptual distinction between Russian ethnicity, Russian language, and Russian statehood. As a result, many Ukrainians subconsciously equate all “Russian” terms — people, language, culture, and the government of the Russian Federation — into a single identity.
This leads to misunderstanding. From the Russian perspective, the rejection of the Russian language by Ukrainians may appear irrational or hostile. But from the Ukrainian side, there is simply no vocabulary to make the distinction. They cannot say “russkiy but not rossiyskiy” — both are “rosiiskyi.”
This lack of linguistic tools creates a political and legal blind spot. Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees the protection of minority languages and commits to international obligations such as the ICCPR. But if the state treats “Russian language” as equivalent to “language of the Russian state,” then the Russian language — as a native language of millions of Ukrainian citizens — is redefined as foreign.
Thus, when state institutions reject Russian-language education or cultural rights, they may believe they are targeting Russian state influence, but in fact, they are also violating the rights of native Russian-speaking Ukrainians.
This is not just a political problem — it is a linguistic malfunction. Without clear words for different meanings, citizens and lawmakers are unable to distinguish between people, language, and regime. This confusion can breed injustice.
Orwell warned that when vocabulary shrinks, so does the ability to think clearly. The Ukrainian language lacks the terms to separate Russian ethnicity, Russian language, and Russian citizenship — and this fuels conflict, misunderstanding, and legal inconsistency.
Fixing this problem may require not just legal reform, but a rethinking of linguistic policy itself — to restore the ability to name things properly and to protect the rights of all Ukrainian citizens, regardless of the language they speak.