1. Linguistic and Legal Clarification

The Meaning of “Narod” in Slavic Traditions vs. “People” in Western Legal Culture

In Anglo-Saxon legal and constitutional traditions, the word “people” is semantically broad and historically flexible. It can refer both to the entire population of a country (“the people of France”, “the American people”) and to a sovereign political subject, endowed with authority and collective rights (“We the People” of the United States Constitution).

This semantic fusion emerged from the Enlightenment political philosophy of the 17th–18th centuries, in which sovereignty was transferred from monarchs to “the people” as an abstract political entity. The term became a legal placeholder for collective legitimacy in the social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and later the framers of modern republics. Importantly, in this tradition, the word “people” does not necessarily imply shared ethnicity, cultural unity, or territorial continuity. It is a civic term that can be applied to any body of citizens under a recognized political order.

By contrast, in Slavic legal and linguistic traditions — including Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, Serbian, Bulgarian, and others — there is no single term that directly replicates the layered meaning of “people” in English. Instead, the concept is bifurcated into two distinct categories, each with its own legal, historical, and semantic weight.

1. “Lyudi” (люди)

Derived from the Old Slavic root “ljud-”, which simply means humans or persons. It corresponds to “individuals”, “people” in the demographic sense, or “human beings” as physical persons.

In legal usage, “lyudi” refers to the population — that is, any group of persons regardless of identity: citizens, residents, migrants, or foreigners. It is a neutral term without implications of collective rights, cultural unity, or sovereign legitimacy. One can be part of the “lyudi” without being part of a “narod”.

2. “Narod” (народ)

This term has a deeply embedded etymological and cultural significance in Slavic civilization. It originates from the Proto-Slavic root “rod”, which means birth, lineage, kinship, or family — from the verb “rodit’” (to give birth). The prefix “na-” implies emergence, belonging, or generation from a source.

Thus, “narod” literally means “those who are born from” — not merely a group of individuals, but a collective body linked by common descent, shared cultural memory, historical continuity, and a defined territorial relationship.

The semantic relatives of “narod” across Slavic languages include:

• “Rodina” — homeland, literally “the land of one’s birth or kin”.

• “Rod” — clan, family line, or ancestral stock.

• “Narodzhennia” — birth (in Ukrainian), further reinforcing the link between peoplehood and biological or cultural origin.

In historical texts, the term “narod” was used to describe the ethnosocial identity of a community before the development of modern nationalism. It denoted a collective that shared not only language or customs, but an ancestral mythos — a sense of being rooted in land and time. In this sense, it was much closer to the ancient Greek concept of ethnos or the German Volksgemeinschaft than to the modern civic “people”.

In legal documents of Slavic countries, particularly post-imperial and post-Soviet states, “narod” retained this ethnocultural connotation. For example:

• In the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 5), it is stated: “The people [narod] are the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine.”

• However, the Constitution does not explicitly define who constitutes the narod — and whether all citizens are automatically included.

This becomes especially critical in light of Ukrainian Law No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples” (2021), which for the first time introduced a legal definition of narod through the concept of korinni narody (indigenous peoples). According to this law, only three groups — Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks — are recognized as indigenous peoples, and thus as legally defined narody. Ethnic Ukrainians were excluded.

This exclusion created a legal asymmetry: members of recognized indigenous groups were granted collective rights, international representation, and cultural autonomy — whereas ethnic Ukrainians, despite being the majority and titular nation, were not recognized as a narod under this legal framework. Instead, they remained in the category of lyudi — individuals subject to the law, but not granted sovereign status or collective protection under international law.

In international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the term “peoples” corresponds to entities with collective identity and the right to self-determination. In English, this would fall under “peoples” plural — not “persons”. Thus, the legal bearer of sovereignty is not any individual, but a politically and culturally recognized group.

When translated into Ukrainian or Russian, these rights refer to narod — not lyudi. Therefore, if a group is not recognized as a narod, it is legally excluded from these rights. Citizenship, in this context, is insufficient to establish collective legal subjectivity. A citizen may owe duties to the state but may lack any collective rights if not part of a legally acknowledged narod.

This distinction underpins a fundamental tension in Ukraine’s constitutional framework after the adoption of Law No. 1616-IX. Ethnic Ukrainians are subject to mobilization and obligations under the Constitution (e.g., Article 17: duty to defend sovereignty), but are not recognized as a narod — the only entity entitled to wield sovereignty under Article 5.

In effect, this creates a structural legal contradiction: the majority population is required to die for a state from which they are legally excluded as a sovereign people.

It is this contradiction — between being a lyudyna (a person) and not a narod (a people) — that renders the current mobilization of ethnic Ukrainians constitutionally inconsistent, and under international law, potentially criminal. Without recognition as a sovereign people, they cannot be lawful subjects of state obligation or bearers of the right to self-determination.

This is not merely a semantic issue, but a structural legal and political crisis embedded in the text of the law itself.

2.The Legal Illusion of Equality: Between Lyudi and Narod

In the history of Nazism and the Holocaust, the process of extermination also began with legislation — carefully drafted in advance to provide a legal framework for each crime. Genocide was not committed in violation of the law, but through the law. Today, the same method is used in a subtler form: legal exclusion, intimidation, militarization, digital surveillance, patriotic slogans, and rhetoric of “national security” and “state necessity.”

The historical example of Jews in Nazi Germany demonstrates a crucial legal lesson: citizenship does not protect if one is excluded from a recognized group. Jews remained citizens on paper, but were stripped of rights and ultimately annihilated because they were no longer considered part of “the people.” This proves that citizenship alone offers neither protection nor a valid basis for imposing obligations — such as conscription — if the individual is not recognized as part of a sovereign collective.

Citizenship is an administrative status reflecting subordination to the state, but it does not entitle a person to participate in the exercise of sovereignty. According to Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine, sovereignty belongs exclusively to the people (narod). At the same time, Article 17 imposes the duty to defend that sovereignty on every citizen.

However, after the adoption of Law No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine,” only three ethnocultural groups — Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks — were legally recognized as indigenous peoples (narody) and thus as bearers of collective rights. Ethnic Ukrainians were excluded, and no other legal act currently defines the composition of the Ukrainian people (as narod) in binding terms.

This creates a clear legal asymmetry: some citizens (recognized indigenous peoples — narody) hold collective status, with rights to representation and international protection, while others — primarily ethnic Ukrainians — bear obligations to the state without being granted the legal status of a people or the right to participate in sovereign authority.

Such a system produces a form of constitutional inequality: one part of the population governs and delegates power, while the other is subordinated and obligated to defend the state — without being recognized as its source of sovereignty. When a person is excluded from the category of “the people,” they are bound by duties without a mandate, unable to act on behalf of a sovereign entity. In the context of conscription, this means some are legal subjects, while others are compelled to die on command — without the right to be subjects of that command.

This division between the “authorized” and the “subordinated” contradicts the foundational principles of democracy and legal equality. In international law, it meets the criteria of institutionalized discrimination, forced labor, and ethnocultural segregation.

International tribunals have repeatedly emphasized that citizenship does not absolve a state of responsibility for genocide, repression, or forced labor. Global legal practice shows that denial of group recognition is often used by states as a legal tactic to conceal crimes.

Therefore, the forced conscription of ethnic Ukrainians solely on the basis of citizenship, without recognition of their status as a people (narod), is not lawful service — it is a form of state violence against an unrecognized group.

2.1 The Legal Nullity of Mobilizing Ethnic Ukrainians: Sovereignty Without People

Under Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine, only the people (narod) are the bearer of sovereignty and the exclusive source of state power. However, Law No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples” has formally deprived ethnic Ukrainians of this status by legally recognizing only three groups — Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks — as peoples (narody) entitled to collective rights.

As a result, the forced mobilization of ethnic Ukrainians constitutes the coercion of a group that is not legally recognized as a sovereign subject to participate in actions on behalf of a state to which it no longer belongs in a legal sense. This not only renders such mobilization unconstitutional but also raises serious concerns under international law.

Constitutional Violations

Article 1 of the Constitution of Ukraine

Ukraine is defined as a democratic, social, and rule-of-law state that guarantees and protects the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens.

Violation:

By excluding ethnic Ukrainians from the legal category of “people,” the state denies them participation in decisions affecting the whole nation. This exclusion deprives them of the constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens and directly contradicts the foundational principle of legal equality.

Article 5 of the Constitution

Sovereignty belongs solely to the people (narod). It is exercised directly and through state bodies.

Violation:

Ethnic Ukrainians, not being recognized as a people, are stripped of sovereign capacity. They cannot delegate power or participate in state governance. Their forced mobilization, especially in the absence of legal subjectivity, violates the principle of popular sovereignty and renders the act illegitimate.

Article 17 of the Constitution

The defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity is the duty of every citizen.

Violation:

This obligation is inseparable from Article 5. A person who is not legally part of the people cannot bear the responsibility of defending sovereignty, since they are excluded from the very source of that sovereignty. Compelling such individuals to fight constitutes a breach of constitutional order and imposes a duty without representation or legal mandate.

Violations of International Law

Geneva Conventions (III and IV)

These conventions regulate the status of combatants and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Violation:

Only members of a recognized party to a conflict may hold combatant status. Individuals who are not legally part of a people (narod) and lack international subjectivity cannot be lawfully mobilized. Forcing ethnic Ukrainians into hostilities without recognizing their sovereign status constitutes a violation of their civilian protections under international humanitarian law.

1948 Genocide Convention — Article II

Genocide includes acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such.

Violation:

The refusal to recognize ethnic Ukrainians as a people facilitates their persecution, including forced conscription. Denial of rights and coercive military involvement without recognition of group status may qualify as genocide through legal erasure, targeting the group “as such.”

ILO Convention No. 29 (1930) on Forced Labour

This convention prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including conscription against one’s will.

Violation:

Mobilizing ethnic Ukrainians without legal recognition or consent constitutes a form of forced labor, prohibited under ILO standards. It reduces persons stripped of sovereign identity to instruments of the state — a direct breach of their individual liberty and international labor protections.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court — Article 7

Defines crimes against humanity, including enslavement, persecution, and forced participation in military conflict.

Violation:

Compelling individuals who are not legally part of the people to fight — without subjectivity, rights, or consent — constitutes enslavement under international law. Such actions meet the threshold of crimes against humanity and are prosecutable under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

 

The mobilization of ethnic Ukrainians, in the absence of recognition as a people (narod), is not only unconstitutional under domestic law — it is legally null, coercive, and criminal. It violates the very principle of sovereignty by demanding defense of a state that has revoked their legal status as its foundation.

Under both Ukrainian constitutional norms and binding international treaties, the imposition of duties without collective rights is a violation of fundamental human dignity and a textbook case of modernized forced submission. Ethnic Ukrainians are thus transformed from citizens into objects of state will — without voice, rights, or protection.

This practice must be urgently recognized, condemned, and reversed — both within Ukraine’s legal system and before international legal bodies.

 

3. The Loss of “People” Status Means the Loss of Sovereign Authority and Legal Mandate

According to Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine:

“The people (narod) are the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power in Ukraine. The people (narod) shall exercise power directly and through state authorities and local self-government bodies.”

However, following the entry into force of Law of Ukraine No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine” (July 1, 2021), ethnic Ukrainians are no longer recognized as a people in the legal sense. The law explicitly designates only Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks as indigenous peoples of Ukraine.

Some may argue that all citizens of Ukraine are, by default, considered part of the people — referencing the Preamble to the Constitution of Ukraine, which states:

“The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on behalf of the Ukrainian people (narod)— the citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities, expressing the sovereign will of the people (narod)…”

However, this wording in the Preamble is not a legally binding definition. It is purely declarative and political-rhetorical in nature. Ukrainian legislation contains no provision that explicitly establishes that every citizen of Ukraine is part of the people (as narod)  as the bearer of sovereignty under Article 5 of the Constitution. Nowhere does the Constitution define: “citizen = people.”

On the contrary, Law No. 1616-IX, adopted on July 1, 2021, introduced — for the first time — a legally binding definition of who is considered a people (narod) (in terms of indigenous peoples) and therefore a subject of collective rights. The law clearly states that Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks are the indigenous peoples (korinniy narod) of Ukraine. Ethnic Ukrainians are absent from this list.

Since there are no other laws, legal acts, or official definitions that define the term “Ukrainian people,” Law No. 1616-IX currently remains the sole effective legal source determining who is officially recognized as a people (narod) in Ukraine. As such, it not only excludes ethnic Ukrainians from this category but also effectively redefines the meaning and function of the Constitution’s Preamble, replacing its collective subject.

Regarding the Decision of the Constitutional Court (Ukraine) No. 1-r/2021:

The judgment contains a reference to the idea that:

“The concept ‘Ukrainian people (narod) — citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities’ used in the Preamble of the Constitution of Ukraine encompasses all individuals, regardless of their ethnic origin, who have a stable legal connection to Ukraine — i.e., Ukrainian citizenship.”

– cannot be regarded as a valid and current source for interpreting the concept of “Ukrainian people” (narod) under the legal framework of Law of Ukraine No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine.” The proceedings in which this decision was issued were initiated in 2019, and the decision itself was published on July 14, 2021 — only two weeks after the adoption of the said law on July 1, 2021.

Prior to the adoption of Law No. 1616-IX, it was generally presumed in practice that the term “Ukrainian people (narod)” encompassed all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic origin. The Constitutional Court confirmed this understanding based on the legal framework in effect at that time. However, Law No. 1616-IX, for the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, introduced a legally binding definition of the term “people, (as narod)” limiting it to a specific set of ethnic groups and, in particular, excluding ethnic Ukrainians. As a result, the interpretive logic of the Constitution’s Preamble was altered, and a legal distinction was introduced between categories of Ukrainian citizens.

Therefore, the reference to Constitutional Court Decision No. 1-r/2021 as a justification for equating the concepts of “citizens of Ukraine” and “Ukrainian people (narod)” has lost its legal relevance. To support such an argument under current law, a new judicial ruling is required — one issued after the entry into force of Law No. 1616-IX and taking into account its new legal framework.

Moreover, the very fact that this passing reference in a Constitutional Court decision is invoked as the sole legal basis for defining “the people” (narod) only highlights the fragility of such a construction. No international court would recognize such a reference — absent a clear and explicit provision in statutory law or the Constitution itself — as sufficient to establish the sovereign status of a group.

Since the entry into force of Law No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine”:

• the entire legal system of Ukraine is required to operate in accordance with the definitions established by this law, including the definition of “indigenous people”;

• any interpretations of the term “people (narod)” — including those based on the Preamble to the Constitution of Ukraine — lose legal validity if they contradict the provisions of this law.

Thus, the definition of “people” introduced by Law No. 1616-IX alters the legal meaning of Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine, effectively depriving ethnic Ukrainians of the status of sovereign subjects. This occurs because they no longer fall under the legal definition of “people” (narod) as set forth by the law.

This creates a legal paradox:

• Citizenship is retained, but peoplehood is lost.

• As a result, the citizen remains administratively subordinate to the state but lacks the collective rights derived from peoplehood — specifically, the right to delegate power, to participate in self-determination, and to act as a subject in the defense of the state.

Moreover, the Constitution of Ukraine does not distinguish between the terms “people (narod)” and “indigenous people” in its text. In effect, Ukraine has redefined “people (narod)” to mean “indigenous people,” making all citizens — including ethnic Ukrainians — legally dependent on the categories introduced by this law.

The issue is not whether ethnic Ukrainians should be recognized as part of the indigenous population, but rather that the absence of any other legal definitions of “people (narod)” in Ukrainian legislation creates a legal vacuum. Ukrainian law provides no alternative categories for identifying ethnic groups such as Ukrainians, Boykos, Hutsuls, Lemkos, Volynians, Podolians, Slobozhans, or Polissians, unless they are included in the list of indigenous peoples. Therefore, the problem is not one of recognition as indigenous, but of the complete lack of legal recognition for these groups as peoples within the national legal framework. Without a clear definition of their status as distinct peoples, they remain in a state of legal uncertainty — which, in turn, creates both legal and political consequences.

As a result, a Ukrainian citizen who is not recognized as part of “the people” (narod) is not a bearer of sovereignty and therefore lacks the legal mandate to participate in the defense of the people, the state, or the homeland.

4. Participation in War Without the Status of a “People (as Narod)” — A Legal Fiction

If a person is not a subject recognized as having the right to represent a people (narod), then their participation in war cannot be considered a voluntary act of defending that people. Legally, such an individual is either:

• a mercenary — not a representative of a subject of international law,

• or an object of external coercion.

This directly contradicts established norms of international law:

• Geneva Convention III (Article 4): combatant status is reserved for members of a party to a conflict recognized as a subject of international law.

• Additional Protocol I (1977), Article 47: mercenaries are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status.

Therefore, a Ukrainian who is not recognized as part of a people (narod) cannot be considered a lawful combatant. Forcing such a person to participate in war qualifies as a form of enslavement.

Precedents from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), including İlhan v. Turkey (2000) and Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (2008), affirm that:

a state’s refusal to recognize an ethnic group does not exempt it from its obligations under international law.

Ukraine’s attempt to legally “nullify” the status of ethnic Ukrainians does not eliminate their right to protection — on the contrary, it transforms conscription into a form of state violence against a group stripped of legal rights.

 

5. The Genocide Convention (1948): Destruction of a “Group as Such”

“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” (Article II).

The key phrase here is “as such” — meaning a group that is legally recognized as a subject of collective legal personhood. By excluding ethnic Ukrainians from the list of recognized peoples (narody), Ukraine has effectively removed the legal obligation to acknowledge any acts against them as genocide.

A response such as:

“This was not an attack on a people — because no such group exists in our legislation,”

perfectly aligns with the logic of legally erasing the victim.

This is the essence of what may be called the doctrine of legal nullification:

A group can be destroyed not because it is recognized, but precisely because — de jure — it does not exist.

This strategy has been used before: in Myanmar (Rohingya), Rwanda (Tutsi), and Yugoslavia (Bosniaks), and was condemned by international courts as a deliberate method of concealing crimes against humanity.

 

6. The Systemic Exclusion of Ethnic Ukrainians from “People (Narod)” Status — Evidence of Intent

The exclusion of ethnic Ukrainians from the legal concept of narod (people) is not accidental. It is a deliberate, multi-layered legal and institutional construction, built upon:

• Law No. 1616-IX, which legally recognizes only three ethnocultural groups — Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks — as indigenous peoples (korinni narody). The titular nation (ethnic Ukrainians), as well as Ukraine’s autochthonous ethnocultural subgroups — including Boykos, Hutsuls, Lemkos, Podolians, Volynians, Slobozhans, Polissians, and others — are not included in this list and have no collective legal status.

• The absence of a definition of the “Ukrainian people (narod)” in the Constitution.

• The absence of a “nationality” field in Ukrainian passports.

• The refusal by courts, the Central Election Commission, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other state bodies to use the category “ethnic Ukrainians” in legal or administrative practice.

Further evidence of state intent can be seen in judicial precedent. For example, in case No. 160/2592/23, dated February 5, 2025, the Supreme Court (Ukraine) ruled that military mobilization is irreversible, even if declared unlawful. This legal position demonstrates the state’s deliberate refusal to restore the rights of those subjected to forced mobilization, despite the acknowledgment of legal violations. Such a doctrine not only disregards the principles of justice, but actively confirms an institutional commitment to the continued coercion of unrecognized groups, even in the absence of any legal subjectivity.

Taken together, these elements create a situation in which the destruction of the titular ethnic group becomes legally possible without consequences, because it de jure does not exist as a subject of international protection.

 

7. Precedents: Rwanda, Myanmar, the Balkans

International legal practice has documented several analogous cases where the refusal to recognize a group was used as a means to conceal or justify acts of genocide:

• Rwanda (1994): The authorities denied that the Tutsi constituted a distinct people, insisting instead that “all are citizens of Rwanda.”

• Myanmar: The Rohingya were denied recognition as a people, which enabled the government to disregard their persecution and the ethnic cleansing carried out against them.

• Srebrenica (Bosnia): Serbian forces claimed that their actions were aimed at “combating militants,” rather than the extermination of Bosnian Muslims as a group.

These examples demonstrate a consistent pattern: the denial of ethnic group recognition is a central element in the legal strategy of genocide denial.

 

8. Avoidance of Declaring War — A Legal Mechanism for Concealing Genocide

The situation is further aggravated by the fact that neither Ukraine nor Russia has officially declared a state of war, despite the scale and nature of the conflict.

Under international law — including the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute, and the UN Charter — a formal state of war requires the application of the following legal safeguards:

• Protection of civilians (Geneva Convention IV),

• Recognition of combatant and prisoner-of-war status (Geneva Convention III, Article 4),

• International oversight and monitoring,

• Implementation of the norms of international humanitarian law.

However, Ukraine has deliberately avoided using the term “war,” instead enforcing a regime of martial law, which enables the authorities to:

• Evade obligations under the Geneva Conventions,

• Treat mobilization and repression as internal matters,

• Deny that the target of violence is a people (narod) with collective rights.

This constitutes a legal fiction — a deliberate maneuver that effectively removes Ukrainian citizens from the scope of international protection.

 

9. Legal Consequences: A Person Without the Status of “People (Narod)” Cannot Be a Subject of Mobilization or State Obligations

If a person is not recognized as part of a people (narod), then:

• They are not a bearer of sovereignty (Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine),

• They cannot be a source of authority,

• They cannot represent the people or act on its behalf.

Therefore, their participation in war cannot be considered defense of the homeland, and their mobilization cannot be treated as fulfillment of civic duty.

This fundamentally destroys the constitutional construction of a “duty to the state”, because:

• The Constitution obligates citizens to serve the people — not merely the “state” as a bureaucratic apparatus;

• If a person is excluded from the definition of the people, they cannot be bound by obligations delegated by the people — including participation in war.

Thus, the forced involvement of such a person in war:

• Contradicts the Constitution of Ukraine (Articles 1, 5, and 17),

• Violates the Geneva Conventions (which prohibit compelling civilians to take part in hostilities),

• Violates the Slavery Convention (1926) and ILO Convention No. 29,

• May qualify under Article 7 of the Rome Statute as a crime against humanity in the form of enslavement.

Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine indeed states that the defense of sovereignty is the duty of every citizen. However, within the constitutional framework, this duty does not exist in isolation. The obligations of a citizen derive from their status as a bearer of sovereignty (Article 5) — i.e., as part of the people.

If an ethnic Ukrainian is not recognized as part of the people, then legally they cannot be a subject on whose behalf state power is exercised. Consequently, invoking Article 17 as a universal justification for mobilization loses its legal force.

The Constitution does not impose obligations on a mere object of power. Only the bearer of power can be its legitimate defender. Otherwise, mobilization becomes forced service to an alien sovereign, contradicting the democratic principle and equality before the law.

 

10. Why Citizenship Cannot Serve as Legal Justification for Mobilization

The argument that “you are a citizen, therefore you are obligated” does not withstand legal scrutiny for the following reasons:

10.1. Citizenship is an administrative-legal status, not a source of sovereign authority

Unlike belonging to a people (narod), citizenship does not grant a person the right to be a source of power. It merely reflects a legal connection to the state apparatus. However, duties related to defending the state can only be imposed on bearers of sovereignty — that is, on a recognized people.

10.2. A citizen who is not recognized as part of a people (narod) is not a subject of power, but an object of power

In circumstances where an ethnic Ukrainian:

• is not recognized as part of the people (narod),

• does not possess collective rights,

• lacks legal status as an ethnocultural group,

their citizenship becomes a technical instrument of control, not a foundation of rights and responsibilities. This undermines the principle of equality before the law (Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine) and results in ethnic discrimination — since Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks enjoy expanded rights as recognized indigenous peoples.

10.3. International Law Takes Precedence: Domestic Legislation Cannot Justify a Crime

According to Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:

“The official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a government or parliament… shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility…”

Likewise, administrative citizenship cannot be used to justify violations of fundamental human rights, such as:

• freedom from forced labor (ILO Convention No. 29),

• the right to life (ICCPR, Article 6),

• prohibition of forced participation in armed conflict without recognized subjectivity (Geneva Conventions III and IV),

• the prohibition of genocide and the destruction of unrecognized groups (Genocide Convention, Article II).

10.4. In International Practice, Citizenship Has Never Justified Repression

• In Rwanda, the victims were citizens of Rwanda.

• In Myanmar, the Rohingya were considered citizens (until the 1982 law), yet this did not prevent international courts from recognizing the acts committed against them as genocide.

• In Germany, Jews were also citizens before the Holocaust — but that did not protect them from systemic extermination.

Thus, citizenship is not a shield that absolves the state of responsibility; rather, it becomes further evidence that crimes are committed against its own population.

Citizenship without recognition of peoplehood does not create lawful obligations — it turns the individual into a manageable object, stripped of the rights to resist, to self-determination, and to protection. Forced participation in war under such conditions is not a duty — it is a form of state violence.

Moreover, this situation challenges the foundations of the global legal system. In most democratic states where military service or repatriation exist, such practices are applied within a legal framework where all citizens are equally recognized as part of the sovereign people.

For example, in Poland, a Polish citizen may be conscripted, repatriated, or politically obligated precisely because they are recognized as part of the Polish people and, therefore, a legitimate source of sovereignty.

Similarly, in Germany, France, or the United States, civic duties arise not merely from technical citizenship, but from membership in a fully recognized collective sovereign entity.

In Ukraine’s current legal framework, however, obligations such as conscription are imposed on ethnic Ukrainians who are not recognized as part of the sovereign people (narod).

This legal asymmetry mirrors historical patterns of institutionalized discrimination and directly violates the principle of non-discrimination under international law (ICCPR Article 26; ECHR Article 14).

It turns citizens into second-class entities — subject to obligations without the corresponding rights of collective participation and self-governance.

A person excluded from peoplehood does not merely have a right to refuse participation in war — they have a right to seek international protection as an individual under threat of genocide, slavery, and crimes against humanity.

 

11. State Derogation and Deferred Jurisdiction as Tools for Concealing Genocide

All of the above is further aggravated by the fact that Ukraine has:

• since 2022, officially derogated from its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8, 10, 11, 14, etc. — including the prohibition of discrimination);

• restricted the application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

• and ratified the Rome Statute (on August 24, 2024) with a seven-year delay, effectively excluding its provisions from applying to current crimes.

This means:

• the state has officially admitted that it cannot or will not comply with basic human rights standards;

• and at the same time, has opted out of international criminal jurisdiction that could classify ongoing actions as crimes against humanity or genocide.

This combination — derogation, exclusion of an ethnic group from the legal definition of “people,” and the temporary suspension of the Rome Statute — cannot be coincidental. It constitutes a deliberate legal architecture designed to:

• eliminate the collective legal subjectivity of ethnic Ukrainians;

• deprive them of international protection;

• and shield the state from criminal accountability for ongoing violations.

This is not a legal collapse — it is a premeditated legal system for concealing the commission of genocide.

 

12. The Legal Right to Refuse Participation in War and to Seek International Protection

A person who:

• is not recognized as part of the Ukrainian people (narod),

• does not possess collective rights,

• is being coerced into participation in an armed conflict without a formal declaration of war,

• is protected by neither the Constitution nor Ukraine’s international treaty obligations,

has the full legal right to:

• refuse participation in military actions on the grounds of lacking a legal mandate,

• seek international protection, including refugee status or asylum, based on the following grounds:

  • persecution due to belonging to a group deprived of rights,

  • threat to life due to forced mobilization,

  • inability to obtain legal protection within the country.

This is a legal position grounded in:

• the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948),

• the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998),

• the Geneva Conventions (1949),

• the Constitution of Ukraine,

• Law No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine”, and Precedents in International Legal Practice: Proven Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Legal Uncertainty

1. Rwanda: Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4, 1998)

   The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity for acts committed against the Tutsi population, despite the Rwandan authorities denying the distinct status of the group and referring to all individuals as “citizens.” The tribunal affirmed that the destruction of a group can occur even without official recognition, as long as the group possesses an identifiable ethnic or social identity.

2. Myanmar: The Gambia v. Myanmar (ICJ, No. 178, 2019)

   The International Court of Justice ruled that the persecution of the Rohingya — an ethnic group stripped of citizenship by Myanmar’s 1982 law — may qualify as genocide. The Court confirmed that the absence of citizenship does not remove international protection from a group, and that a state cannot evade responsibility for genocide by relying on the legal non-recognition of the victim group.

3. Bosnia: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (ICJ, 2007)

   The ICJ found that the actions of Serbian armed forces in Srebrenica, even in the absence of formal recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a distinct nation by the aggressor, constituted genocide. The Court stated that subjective non-recognition of a group does not exempt a state from accountability.

4. Legal Uncertainty: Vikunia v. Spain (ECtHR, No. 25460/11, 2020)

   The European Court of Human Rights held that vagueness in legal definitions violates Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights by creating a “chilling effect” and preventing individuals from anticipating the legal consequences of their actions. This precedent is particularly relevant in the context of the ambiguous status of “the people” (narod) under Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

History has never witnessed such a level of legal uncertainty that so directly leads to systemic discrimination and the deprivation of rights from an ethnic majority. In the absence of a clear definition of the term “people” (narod) in the Constitution of Ukraine, legal ambiguity becomes a tool of juridical violence — excluding ethnic Ukrainians from the status of sovereign subjects and exposing them to the risk of being unprotected as rights-bearing entities.

This constitutes a violation not only of their right to self-determination and participation in state governance but also of their right to international protection, jeopardizing their legal status and access to rights guaranteed by international norms.

If a group is not legally recognized as a “people” (narod), its collective rights — including the right to protection from genocide and persecution — fall outside the scope of legal protection. This is the direct result of the doctrine of legal nullification and the total exclusion of ethnic Ukrainians from the territory of rights and recognition.

 

13. Constitutional Discrimination and International Violations

International law — particularly ILO Convention No. 169 on the rights of Indigenous Peoples — explicitly recognizes the right of peoples to preserve their institutions, traditions, and customs. According to Articles 8 and 9 of this Convention, “States shall consult Indigenous peoples before adopting legislative or administrative measures that may affect their rights.” Moreover, these articles grant Indigenous peoples the right to self-governance and the ability to refuse the application of state laws if such laws contradict their culture and way of life. Article 8 of the Convention states:

“Peoples have the right to retain and develop their institutional and cultural characteristics, and any changes affecting these aspects must be agreed upon with them.”

This means that recognized peoples have the right to self-governance and may legally refuse to comply with laws that contradict their collective identity and are not agreed upon by their representatives.

However, in the case of ethnic Ukrainians, the situation is fundamentally different. They do not have legal status as a people (narod), and their right to self-determination has been delegated to the state — in direct violation of international norms. According to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):

“States shall protect the rights of minorities to equality and participation in public life.”

Yet ethnic Ukrainians have no right to be recognized as a people (narod), no international representation, and their rights remain limited, because their right to self-determination has been delegated to the state — meaning it has been replaced by the authority of the state apparatus.

The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees the equality of all citizens, which is explicitly stated in Article 24:

“All citizens have equal rights and freedoms and are equal before the law.”

However, Law No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine,” adopted on July 1, 2021, creates a legal asymmetry between ethnic groups. According to this law, indigenous peoples (Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks) are granted rights to representation in government bodies, cultural autonomy, quotas in local authorities, and the ability to advocate for their interests on the international stage. At the same time, ethnic Ukrainians — despite being the titular nation — are not recognized as a people (narod), do not possess collective rights, and are required to obey all laws without the ability to defend their group interests.

This violates the principle of equality enshrined in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states:

“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”

Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine establishes that:

“The people (narod) are the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine.”

However, Law No. 1616-IX effectively excludes ethnic Ukrainians from this definition, recognizing only indigenous peoples as the true bearers of sovereignty. This undermines the principle of legal equality set forth both in the Constitution and in international instruments such as Article 26 of the ICCPR. As a result, ethnic Ukrainians are deprived of the status of a people and the rights that international law affords to recognized indigenous peoples.

ILO Convention No. 169 further confirms that recognized peoples have the right to refuse to comply with laws that contradict their culture and that are not agreed upon by their representatives — a right that ethnic Ukrainians cannot exercise, as they lack institutional representation. Recognized indigenous peoples are also entitled to establish their own courts and justice mechanisms, as provided for in Article 9 of ILO Convention No. 169.

“States shall respect the right of indigenous peoples to establish and maintain their own legal systems.”

Ethnic Ukrainians are deprived of this right, which means they have no means of defending their cultural and political interests.

Moreover, constitutional discrimination is also evident in the fact that neither the Constitution of Ukraine nor Law No. 1616-IX establishes any requirement of citizenship for a group to be recognized as a people (narod)— as the bearer of sovereignty and, consequently, the source of power. This creates a unique legal paradox: Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks are recognized as bearers of Ukraine’s sovereignty, despite the fact that a significant portion of their members are not Ukrainian citizens and do not reside on Ukrainian territory.

Approximate population estimates:

• Crimean Tatars: between 500,000 and 1 million globally; around 250,000 reside in Crimea, the rest live in Turkey, Uzbekistan, Romania, and Russia.

• Karaites: around 50,000 worldwide, with most living in Israel.

• Krymchaks: approximately 1,200–1,500 people total, with fewer than 230 residing in Crimea.

Law No. 1616-IX grants these groups the legal status of a people, recognizes their collective rights, and designates them as sovereign entities — regardless of their citizenship, population size, or actual residence in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, ethnic Ukrainians — the titular nation and absolute majority of the population, who maintain and operate the state — are not recognized as a people (narod) at all. As a result, a legally codified inequality emerges in which stateless minorities are recognized as sovereign authorities, while the majority of citizens are not. This undermines the very concept of popular sovereignty enshrined in Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine and constitutes a flagrant violation of legal symmetry and equality before the law.

Neither the Constitution of Ukraine nor Law No. 1616-IX requires that recognized indigenous peoples hold Ukrainian citizenship in order to be designated as “peoples” (narody) or bearers of sovereignty. Yet, these groups are granted exclusive rights of collective representation and access to sovereign authority.

Meanwhile, ethnic Ukrainians — despite holding citizenship and comprising the absolute majority — are not recognized as a people and are therefore excluded from sovereign power. This creates a legal contradiction in which sovereignty is assigned to non-citizen minorities, while obligations are imposed on the unrecognized majority.

 

14. The Military Oath Is Sworn to the People, Not to the State or Citizens

According to Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On Military Duty and Military Service,” the military oath states:

“I, (Full Name), upon entering military service, solemnly swear to always remain loyal and faithful to the People (Narod) of Ukraine…”

This means that even the military oath, from a legal standpoint, is addressed not to the state, nor to “the citizens of Ukraine,” but to the people (narod) as the sole source of authority.

Therefore:

• If a person is not legally recognized as part of the Ukrainian people (narod), they cannot legitimately swear allegiance to it, as they do not belong to this collective category;

• Their participation in military service lacks a valid legal subject on whose behalf they act;

• The mobilization of such a person becomes an act of compelled service without a legitimate object of loyalty — effectively, forced defense of the interests of a group to which they do not belong.

This confirms the legal fiction whereby an individual is made to swear to protect the sovereignty of a collective from which they are formally excluded. It further reinforces the argument that such mobilization constitutes coerced involvement of an unrecognized group in service of another subject.

15. Legal Conclusion

In the event of loss of citizenship — a measure systematically used throughout the war as an instrument of blackmail, threats, and pressure by both propaganda and state structures, including personal statements by President Zelensky — an ethnic Ukrainian, who is not legally recognized as part of a people (narod), loses any legal connection to both the state and collective identity. This makes it impossible for such a person to exercise their rights to protection, representation, and participation in self-determination. Deprived of both the status of a people and citizenship, they effectively become a legally nonexistent subject.

Unlike citizenship, which can be revoked, the rights of indigenous peoples recognized under international law persist regardless of individual citizenship status. According to Article 8 of ILO Convention No. 169, indigenous peoples have the right to preserve their cultural and institutional distinctiveness, independent of the citizenship of their members. In this context, Ukraine’s Law No. 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine” also affirms that indigenous groups such as Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks retain rights to self-government, cultural autonomy, and international representation even if they lose their citizenship. Article 2 of this law confirms that indigenous peoples can exercise self-government and maintain their social and cultural institutions despite the absence of citizenship.

Thus, in a situation where an ethnic Ukrainian is stripped of recognition as a people (narod), their mobilization effectively serves not the interests of their own group, but the interests of the recognized indigenous peoples on whose behalf the state acts. This means that mobilization takes place in the interests of sovereign groups to which the conscripted individual does not belong.

Under such conditions, the mobilization of an ethnic Ukrainian is not merely unjust but legally criminal — both under the norms of the Constitution of Ukraine (Articles 1, 5, and 24) and under Ukraine’s international obligations, including the Rome Statute, ILO Convention No. 29, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It constitutes a form of discriminatory violence directed against an unrecognized group.

The deprivation of ethnic Ukrainians of the status of “people” (narod) under Ukraine’s Law No. 1616-IX not only renders mobilization a legally questionable and potentially criminal practice (since the state compels service from individuals who are not recognized as the bearers of sovereignty), but also effectively deprives this group of access to collective rights guaranteed by:

• Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);

• Articles 25 and 26 of the ICCPR (participation in governance and non-discrimination);

• Article 1 of the UN Charter (the right of peoples to self-determination);

• Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (protection against discrimination);

as well as the inviolable principle of the legal subjectivity of every people.

Law No. 1616-IX de facto establishes a regime of systemic legal exclusion of the ethnic majority — the titular nation — from the category of peoples entitled to international legal protection. This constitutes not only internal discrimination but also a violation of international law that demands urgent review by the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and international judicial institutions.

Thus, in a situation where ethnic Ukrainians are deprived of recognition as a people and lack the right to represent sovereignty, their forced involvement in an armed conflict has no lawful basis. It cannot be classified as the fulfillment of a civic duty, as there is no legal connection between the conscript and the sovereign entity exercising authority.

Legally, such mobilization constitutes the involvement of an unrecognized group in military actions in the interests of an external sovereign entity, violating fundamental principles of constitutional and international law. It is not service to the Homeland, but rather a form of forced subjugation devoid of legitimacy.

The collapse of ceasefire talks in London on April 23, 2025, after Ukraine refused to discuss Crimea’s status,  unveils a legal trap rooted in Law No. 1616-IX (2021). Promoted as protection for Crimean minorities, the law designated only Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks—groups primarily tied to a Crimea under Russian control since 2014—as Ukraine’s “indigenous peoples” (korinni narody), extending their collective rights across the entire country despite their minimal presence in mainland regions. This maneuver reinterprets the constitutional “people” (narod) under Article 5, anchoring sovereignty to a region Ukraine no longer controls. By tying sovereignty to these groups, the law sidelines ethnic Ukrainians, the majority, who lack recognition as a sovereign people, facing discrimination, legal inequality, and forced conscription into a state serving others in their name. Any concession on Crimea would dismantle this framework, threatening institutional legitimacy. Ukraine’s rigid stance, puzzling to the world, stems from this: surrendering Crimea risks not just ending the war but unraveling the legal foundation of the post-2021 state.

 

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Disclaimer

This text was not written by a professional lawyer, but by a civilian committed to defending the rights and legal subjectivity of ethnic Ukrainians. It is based on an analysis of national and international legislation, official documents, and judicial precedents. It is not an attempt to undermine the constitutional order of Ukraine, but rather a call to recognize and correct a system of legal exclusion. The purpose of this work is to draw attention to systemic discrimination and to advocate for its elimination through constitutional and legislative reform—so that all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, may once again be recognized as equal members of the sovereign people.

The author is neither a patriot nor a nationalist and does not act out of emotional attachment to any country. The focus is solely on legal logic and the defense of collective rights. References to ethnic Ukrainians highlight a broader issue of systemic discrimination against all unrecognized groups.

It should be explicitly noted that, under the conditions prevailing in Ukraine from 2022 to 2025, the vast majority of legal professionals have been deprived of the ability to freely express their views — particularly on issues such as mobilization, derogation of rights, discrimination, or genocide. Statements contradicting the official position of the authorities may lead to disbarment, criminal prosecution, imprisonment, or in some cases, even physical elimination.

In such circumstances, the silence of the legal community cannot be interpreted as evidence of the lawfulness of mobilization or the absence of violations. On the contrary, it serves as indirect confirmation of systemic fear, legal terror, and state pressure on legal professionals.

If any current or former lawyer, legal scholar, law professor, judge, or attorney is able to present a public legal position that refutes the arguments put forth here, the author is fully prepared to consider it immediately and, if necessary, revise or remove the text and issue a public apology to Ukrainian society. Until then, this document remains a civilian act of legal self-defense in the face of juridical silence and institutionalized violence.

The author categorically condemns Russian aggression, occupation, war crimes, and terrorist attacks on Ukrainian territory, as well as any violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The purpose of this material is not to deny the war, but to legally expose the internal mechanism of discrimination that leads to the destruction of an ethnic group within the framework of Ukrainian jurisdiction. The claim of genocide applies both to the actions of the Russian Federation and to the internal legal structure of Ukraine, which — by excluding ethnic Ukrainians from the status of “people” (narod) — has deprived them of legal subjectivity and the means of self-protection.

This article is not directed against any ethnic group. The author expresses no hostility toward Crimean Tatars, Karaites, Krymchaks, or any other recognized community. Their identity, culture, and historical experience are respected. The author explicitly rejects any form of xenophobia, ethnic prejudice, or political extremism. This position is based not on hatred, but on the principles of law, equality, and constitutional justice for all citizens.

The critique presented here is not ethnic in nature, but political and institutional — addressed solely to the Ukrainian state and its leadership, who have redefined sovereignty in a way that structurally excludes the ethnic Ukrainian majority from legal recognition as a people.

Readers of this article are invited to consider the following: how is a Ukrainian citizen, the author of this text, expected to live with the awareness of everything outlined above? And can this article truly be interpreted as anything other than a peaceful act of resistance — a principled affirmation of the sovereignty of his own people?

Reference Note:

At the time of Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR of 1978 — still in force with amendments — did not contain a preamble, reflecting the Soviet legal tradition, which excluded declarative provisions on “the people” or “sovereignty.”

A preamble was introduced for the first time in the Constitution of Ukraine adopted on June 28, 1996, by Law No. 254/96-ВР, with the formulation: “The Ukrainian people — citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities”, which sparked debate due to the substitution of the ethnic concept of “people” (narod) with a political one. The only amendment to the preamble was made by Law No. 2680-VIII of February 7, 2019, which added language about “the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic course.”

Criticism of the preamble for its declarative nature and ambiguity is not new. In a 2009 article, Oleksandr Shokalo (“The Thesis of the Constitution ‘Ukrainian People – Citizens of Ukraine of All Nationalities’ Is Erroneous”), argued that it erases the ethnic identity of Ukrainians. Similarly, in his 2020 article, H. V. Berchenko (“The Preamble of the Constitution: Legal Nature and the Practice of Amendments”), emphasized its limited normative power and controversial nature, reinforcing the argument about constitutional ambiguity.