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This document provides a comprehensive legal and factual analysis of systemic human rights violations and institutional repression in Ukraine between 2022 and 2025. Based on constitutional law, international treaties, and documented cases, it demonstrates how the Ukrainian government has employed selective conscription, suppression of dissent, and extrajudicial measures under undeclared state of war conditions. The report highlights the use of internal structures - including the Territorial Centers of Recruitment (TRC), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and other state organs - to enforce coercive policies that undermine civil liberties, democratic governance, and legal protections.

The document is not written by a legal professional, but by a Ukrainian citizen directly affected by these policies. Its purpose is twofold:

(1) to raise awareness within the international community about the legal abuses taking place in Ukraine; and

(2) to provide a structured reference for lawyers, asylum officers, human rights defenders, and NGOs working with Ukrainian citizens abroad - especially those at risk of forced mobilization or political persecution. The legal framework presented herein may assist in asylum claims, non-refoulement defenses, and broader human rights advocacy.

1. Context and Intent

For nearly three years, the word “peace” was effectively banned from Ukrainian public discourse. In media, politics, and official communications, any reference to peace was systematically replaced with “victory”. The idea of ending the conflict through negotiation, diplomacy, or compromise was portrayed not only as naive and treasonous but was also subject to legislative restrictions. On September 30, 2022, President Volodymyr Zelensky issued Decree No. 679/2022, enforcing a decision by the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) that formally declared negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin impossible.

By institutionalizing the rejection of negotiations through executive order, the Ukrainian government eliminated any legitimate path toward conflict resolution outside of total military confrontation. This legal entrenchment of war ideology ensured that dissenting voices - including civil society actors, opposition politicians, and ordinary citizens - could be prosecuted or censored for advocating alternatives to continued warfare.

At the same time, enormous resources - in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars - were raised and allocated for the continuation of war. Yet, not even a fraction of that was mobilized in support of a peaceful resolution. The state created an ideological environment where even mentioning peace could result in public shaming, job loss, legal consequences, or violence.

This narrative was reinforced by an aggressive propaganda campaign that framed all Russian citizens - not just combatants or officials - as existential enemies. Hatred toward Russians was not only normalized but institutionalized, extending to women, children, and the elderly. Ukrainians were conditioned to view every Russian as a legitimate target of hostility, while internal calls for peace were branded as sabotage or enemy propaganda.

From the outset of the war in 2022, Ukrainian state media systematically replaced objective reality with an illusion of strategic breakthroughs. A central part of this effort was the continuous promotion of so-called “miracle weapons” - military technologies presented as decisive instruments of victory.

First came the Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, followed by U.S.-supplied Javelin anti-tank systems, then HIMARS precision rocket launchers, Patriot missile defense systems, and eventually the much-anticipated F-16 fighter jets. Each new weapons package was portrayed as a game-changer that would imminently shift the balance of the war.

When the effect of one “miracle” faded, it was replaced by the next narrative. After F-16s, public attention was redirected toward the promise of NATO membership, and eventually toward expectations that Russia would pay Ukraine reparations. These reparations, according to official statements and media reports, were to come from frozen Russian assets abroad - although as of this writing, none of those assets have actually been unfrozen. Despite this, the illusion continued to fuel public hope.

These narratives were disseminated 24/7 through the national telethon - the only state-approved broadcast platform operating after all independent television channels were shut down. Alternative viewpoints were virtually absent, and any public skepticism about the efficacy of these weapons, NATO accession, or reparations was labeled as enemy propaganda.

Even cautious dissent was met with accusations of collaboration with the Kremlin, participation in information warfare (IPSO), or outright treason. This environment made rational discourse impossible and ensured that war remained the only accepted framework for national survival.

At the core of this strategy was the unspoken recognition that a true military victory was impossible. Even if Ukrainian forces were able to reclaim territory, the core threat - missile strikes and air raids - would persist. Short of marching into Moscow and overthrowing the Russian government, the war could not be “won” in any conventional sense. This fundamental military reality was never acknowledged publicly. Instead, the state promoted an illusion of imminent victory to justify continued mobilization, societal control, and external fundraising.

In this light, the repeated invocation of “victory” may itself be interpreted as a form of treason — a deliberate misrepresentation of the strategic situation for political gain, leading to the destruction of the nation’s demographic, institutional, and moral foundations.

The consistent criminalization of peace, the glorification of vengeance, and the institutionalized suppression of alternative viewpoints appear not as errors of governance but as elements of a deliberate strategy to destroy the Ukrainian state from within. This strategy has created a civic environment where fear, silence, and hatred are the dominant social norms.

Understanding this is critical - not only to assess Ukraine’s current legal status, but also to recognize the broader implications of exporting such methods to other countries under the guise of democracy, security, or resistance.

 

1.1. Segregation and Suppression of Dissent

Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainian authorities have deliberately pursued a policy of internal divisions, fragmenting society and suppressing solidarity. This process was not spontaneous but systematically reinforced through official narratives and media control.

The first major division occurred along territorial lines—between those who fled the country and those who remained. Those who left were often labeled as traitors or cowards, while those who stayed found themselves trapped under an increasingly repressive state.

The second division was linguistic. The Russian language, spoken by nearly half of the population, was framed as “the language of the occupier,” and its use in both private and public settings came to be seen as a marker of disloyalty to the state.

While Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to use the Russian language freely, in practice, its use was met with social condemnation and pressure. Though not legally classified as a crime, in the media and public discourse, speaking Russian was effectively equated with treason and betrayal.

This resulted in firings, public shaming, threats, and stigmatization. Millions of Russian-language books were destroyed, and access to Russian television channels, websites, and social media platforms was completely blocked.

A further symbolic step deepening internal divisions was the legislative decision to shift the celebration of Christmas from January 7 (the traditional Orthodox date) to December 25, aligning it with the Catholic calendar. The initiative was submitted by President Volodymyr Zelensky and passed by the Ukrainian Parliament in an expedited procedure, without public referendum or meaningful civic debate. It was formalized through Law No. 3258-IX of July 14, 2023, which amended Article 73 of the Labor Code of Ukraine. The law entered into force on July 29, 2023, and officially removed January 7 from the list of public holidays.

The decision was driven entirely by political motives, deepening social divisions and alienating a large part of the population, even though more than 72% of Ukrainians identify as Orthodox Christians — a majority whose views were disregarded.

 

1.2. Control through Border Closure

However, the primary mechanism of control was not ideological but logistical - the closure of Ukraine’s borders.

By sealing its borders, Ukrainian authorities not only restricted freedom of movement but effectively stripped men of their right to protest.

 • Those with financial means could escape through corruption schemes and loopholes, after which they had little incentive to challenge the system.

 • Those who remained were left without resources, support, or legal recourse, placing them in a state of total dependence and isolation.

As a result, an artificial system was created where those without choices remained silent, while those with choices were indifferent.

Millions of Ukrainian men who were abroad at the time of the war’s outbreak did not return - not because of active combat or Russian aggression, but out of fear of being forcibly detained inside the country.

They understood that crossing the border meant being trapped with no right to leave, effectively turning them into hostages of a regime that increasingly stripped them of their rights and freedoms.

This reality was widely recognized, even in mass perception: one of the most viral memes circulating in Ukrainian social media during the war stated that the president had “put the Constitution on pause,” effectively nullifying all civil rights and liberties under martial law.

Ultimately, it was not the war itself, but the closure of Ukraine’s borders that became the decisive factor in the mass non-return of its male citizens.

This was a conscious decision to prioritize personal freedom and safety over submission to a regime that no longer adhered to law, democracy, or human rights.

 

2. Insight

One of the key grievances of the Ukrainian people against their own government is that the level of violence, coercion, and brutality coming from state structures often exceeds the actions committed by the occupying forces. Citizens increasingly perceive the situation not through the lens of an external enemy, but through direct experience of pressure, fear, and repression originating from their own institutions - including the Territorial Centers of Recruitment and Social Support (TCRSS, known in Ukrainian as TCCs), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the National Police, and other administrative bodies. There is a growing perception that the Ukrainian state is deliberately eroding trust in the very concept of Ukrainian statehood, provoking internal demoralization and the devaluation of the idea of sovereignty itself.

The highest degree of tyranny, suppression of rights, and humiliation of dignity is not coming from the Russian army, but from domestic mechanisms of governance that, operating without public accountability, without an officially declared state of war, and without transparent legal grounds, have unleashed a campaign of violence against their own population. This is manifested in street detentions, forced mobilization raids, systematic intimidation, psychological pressure, and economic suffocation through the continued enforcement of taxes, loan payments, and utility bills under conditions of martial law.

While Russian aggression is undeniably violent, its impact is episodic - manifesting through air raids, missile strikes, or localized territorial occupation. These threats, while serious, are intermittent and geographically limited; they do not paralyze the entire nation’s civilian life around the clock. In contrast, the repression imposed by Ukraine’s own institutions - particularly the Territorial Recruitment Centers (TRC) - is permanent, systemic, and all-encompassing. Millions of men live under a constant threat of forced conscription, detention, or persecution, which has led to a de facto state of house arrest across the country. People avoid going outside not because of external bombardment, but because of internal repression - and as a result, the entire economy is functionally immobilized. This permanent condition of fear and stagnation raises legitimate concerns about whether the resulting impoverishment and societal breakdown are merely side effects of war - or part of a deliberate strategy of internal subjugation.

It appears that all of this is being done deliberately - to make Russian occupation seem like a lesser evil in comparison to internal despotism; to have the state destroy trust in itself with its own hands, and then present that collapse as a consequence of “historical inevitability.” By acting in this way, the Ukrainian government is laying the groundwork for complete legal, territorial, and moral disintegration. When a government behaves such that its own citizens begin to perceive the enemy side as the lesser threat, it marks the total bankruptcy of not only political but also ethical legitimacy.

This concern is further deepened by the fact that the entire process is being carried out with the financial support of international partners. Western states, international organizations, and financial institutions continue to unconditionally fund Ukraine’s repressive infrastructure - including the Territorial Centers of Recruitment and Social Support (TCRSS), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and law enforcement agencies - despite documented cases of mass human rights violations, forced mobilization, gender- and age-based discrimination, deportations, and denial of basic documents. The funding is provided with no transparency, no conditionality, and no oversight, which makes these donors not passive observers but direct participants in what is happening. The population increasingly perceives that the destruction of Ukrainians - as citizens, as individuals, as social entities - is part of a deliberate program with political and financial backing.

A particularly egregious element in the discrediting of state authority is the publicly celebrated extrajudicial assassinations of Ukrainian citizens abroad, carried out by or attributed to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). One such case is the targeted killing of Ilya Kyva, a former member of the Ukrainian Parliament, who was shot dead near Moscow on December 6, 2023. While the SBU did not issue an official statement taking responsibility, the killing was openly endorsed in pro-government media and Telegram channels linked to Ukrainian intelligence, where it was presented as a justified punishment - a form of extrajudicial execution carried out without trial, due process, or legal oversight. Another case involves Oleksandr Slesarenko, a former SBU officer accused of treason, who was also assassinated on Russian territory in November 16, 2023. Although the SBU did not formally confirm its role, the operation was widely promoted in affiliated online networks and framed as a successful intelligence mission.

In a country where the death penalty is officially abolished, the extrajudicial killings of Ukrainian citizens abroad violate basic principles of justice and due process. Ilya Kyva had been convicted in absentia and sentenced to 14 years in prison, yet he was executed without extradition, trial in person, or legal oversight. Such actions blur the line between state governance and what, under international standards, qualifies as terrorist activity. While some may argue that intelligence services in many countries resort to similar methods, they do not publicly celebrate them - precisely because doing so would discredit their own legitimacy and the very concept of statehood. In contrast, Ukraine’s open glorification of such killings normalizes political violence carried out by unaccountable institutions.

As a result, more and more citizens of Ukraine are beginning to perceive what is happening not as a war for freedom, but as a war against their own people - against men, against the poor, against those who fled, against those who think differently. The perception of genocide is no longer seen as an external threat; it is increasingly felt as an internal, institutionalized policy. And it is this, more than any foreign enemy, that is destroying the nation from within.

 

3. Illegal and Selective Conscription Without a State of War

 

3.1.1. Absence of a Constitutionally Declared State of War

According to Article 85, Clause 9 of the Constitution of Ukraine, only the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) has the exclusive authority to declare a state of war, and only upon a formal proposal by the President of Ukraine. As of the date of this writing, no such declaration has been made, despite the continuation of full-scale hostilities since February 2022.

Instead, the Ukrainian government has relied on the mechanism of martial law, introduced on February 24, 2022, and continuously extended by parliamentary vote. However, martial law is not equivalent to a state of war and does not fulfill the same constitutional or legal function. It is regulated by the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law”, which, under Article 5, limits the duration of martial law to no more than 90 days per declaration. Despite this limitation, martial law has been prolonged repeatedly for over three years, raising questions about the legality and constitutionality of its indefinite renewal.

 

The distinction between martial law and a state of war is fundamental. A formally declared state of war:

• Establishes a clear legal basis for mass mobilization,

• Triggers specific wartime provisions in both national and international law,

• Allows for lawful suspension of certain constitutional rights under emergency procedures.

By circumventing the declaration of war and indefinitely extending martial law, the Ukrainian government has effectively suspended fundamental rights without fulfilling the necessary constitutional requirements, thereby undermining the legal legitimacy of mass conscription.

 

3.1.2. Constitutional Limits on Compulsory Military Service

 

Article 65 of the Constitution of Ukraine declares:

“Defense of the Homeland, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine is the duty of citizens of Ukraine.”

However, this obligation is expressly limited “in accordance with the law,” meaning that it cannot be enforced arbitrarily or outside of a legally defined wartime framework. Without a declared state of war, the state lacks a proper legal foundation for imposing universal conscription.

 

Furthermore, the enforcement of conscription has proven to be highly selective and coercive, with credible reports of:

• Raids on public places and transport hubs to detain men,

• Targeted mobilization of individuals from rural, poorer, or politically passive regions,

• Exemptions granted to elites, officials, and entertainers,

• Absence of transparent criteria or access to legal remedies for those affected.

This results in systemic inequality, social resentment, and a perception of conscription as repression rather than lawful defense.

 

3.1.3. Violation of International Standards

Ukraine is a party to several binding international human rights treaties, which set clear standards regarding military service and restrictions on personal freedom:

• Article 8(3)(c)(ii) of the ICCPR permits compulsory military service only if it is imposed by law and not as a punishment.

• Article 4(3)(b) of the ECHR similarly allows conscription, but only if it follows established legal procedures and does not constitute forced labor.

• The UN Human Rights Committee and OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Movement and Conscientious Objection require that such obligations be justified, proportionate, and accompanied by mechanisms for individual review and appeal.

The current Ukrainian framework—relying on undeclared war, indefinitely extended martial law, and executive decrees rather than parliamentary legislation—fails to meet these standards, constituting a violation of both constitutional and international legal norms.

3.1.4. Example: Case No. 160/2592/23, dated February 5, 2025, the judicial body currently operating under the name “Supreme Court” acknowledged that the conscription of citizen OSOBA_1 was unlawful due to the absence of a mandatory medical examination. However, the court not only refused to annul the mobilization order or release the individual but also explicitly stated that the mobilization process is irreversible, even in cases where it was conducted with procedural violations. This effectively nullifies citizens’ right to legal protection and creates de facto impunity for the Territorial Centers of Recruitment and Social Support (TCRSS, also known as TCCs).

As of March 2025, criminal liability for unlawful conscription has still not been formally implemented. Draft Law No. 12442, which proposes to establish penalties for violations committed by TRC personnel and medical commissions, was adopted only in the first reading on March 12, 2025, and remains under parliamentary review. For more than three years of full-scale war, recruiters operated without risk of prosecution, despite repeated reports of procedural violations.

Taking into account the fact that once an individual is forcibly mobilized, the process is considered irreversible—even when the mobilization itself is ruled unlawful. As a result, illegally conscripted individuals are transferred into a closed military environment, where access to legal assistance and judicial review is severely restricted. In practice, this makes it nearly impossible for victims to challenge their status or seek redress.

Meanwhile, TRC personnel reportedly continue to receive financial incentives for each individual conscripted, regardless of legality. This creates a perverse incentive structure where unlawful mobilization becomes profitable and unpunished. The combination of irreversible enlistment, lack of legal remedy, and financial motivation fosters systemic abuse and reduces citizens to state-controlled human assets.

These conditions fall within the definition of slavery under Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention, which describes slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” Citizens are compelled into military service without due process, stripped of autonomy, and denied any mechanism of escape or accountability. Even if Draft Law No. 12442 is ultimately passed, its effect remains symbolic for those already absorbed into the system, offering no form of restitution or legal recourse.

This ongoing legal void constitutes a structural violation of Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, both of which require states to ensure effective remedies for human rights violations. In the Ukrainian context, forced conscription has evolved into a risk-free, profit-driven mechanism of repression, effectively legalizing modern servitude under the banner of national defense.

This may indicate that the introduction of criminal liability is not a genuine attempt to restore justice or prevent abuse, but rather a symbolic gesture aimed at appeasing public and international criticism. The lack of retroactive remedies, the judicial precedent rendering mobilization irreversible, and the years-long delay in proposing accountability measures all suggest a deliberate design to preserve the existing system of impunity. Such timing and structure may constitute indirect evidence of intent (mens rea) to maintain coercive practices while shielding perpetrators from real legal consequences.

In such a legal vacuum, forced mobilization becomes a risk-free and profit-generating mechanism. Citizens are reduced to instruments of state control, with no effective rights, remedies, or protections. What emerges is a system where human beings are treated as state-owned assets — a practice that falls squarely within the definition of slavery under Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention.

This is not a gap in the law — it is a state-sanctioned policy of terror. The performative nature of Draft Law No. 12442 is fully exposed by the fact that the Criminal Code of Ukraine already contains provisions under which the actions of the Territorial Recruitment Center (TRC) personnel clearly qualify as serious crimes: Article 146 (abduction), Article 149 (human trafficking), Article 336 (coercion into military service), and Article 365 (abuse of power). Tens of thousands of videos show TRC officers abducting people from the streets, using physical violence, falsifying documents, and operating like a paramilitary gang — yet not a single one has been prosecuted. These laws exist — they are simply not enforced. Instead of applying the existing Criminal Code, the government simulates reform to justify and perpetuate a repressive system, effectively legalizing what amounts to a nationwide apparatus of organized abduction and human trafficking.

3.1.4.1. Legal Note

The current judicial body referred to as the “Supreme Court” was created following the dissolution of the former Supreme Court of Ukraine in 2016 under Law No. 1402-VIII as part of judicial reform. The present institution operates under a restructured mandate and name, which, for unknown reasons, omits the word “Ukraine” from its official title. Its continuity and jurisdiction remain a matter of legal interpretation and public debate.

In judgment no. 11423/19 (Gumenyuk and Others v. Ukraine) issued on 22 July 2021, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that the liquidation of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the removal of its judges violated Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention, effectively acknowledging the unlawful nature of the court’s abolition as incompatible with constitutional guarantees of judicial independence.

 

3.1.5. Restriction of the Right to Leave the Country Through Sub-Legislative Decrees

The travel ban imposed on Ukrainian men aged 18 to 60 was not enacted through a law passed by the Verkhovna Rada, but rather through an executive decree: Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 57 of January 27, 1995, titled “On the Approval of the Rules for Crossing the State Border by Citizens of Ukraine.” In March 2022, the Cabinet amended this resolution via Resolution No. 264 of March 14, 2022, effectively prohibiting men of conscription age from leaving the country.

These changes were implemented through executive action, not legislation, and were never subject to parliamentary debate or judicial oversight. Unlike statutory law, such decrees cannot be directly challenged in the Constitutional Court or international bodies, creating a legal loophole that allows the government to bypass democratic procedures and impose far-reaching restrictions on civil liberties.

This method of restricting fundamental rights through Cabinet decrees rather than laws contradicts Article 33 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which affirms the right of every citizen to freely leave the country, as well as key international human rights norms.

 

Specifically, Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that:

 

“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”

Any restrictions on this right must, according to Article 12(3), be provided by law, pursue a legitimate aim (such as national security or public order), and be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society.

In Ukraine’s case, the restriction was imposed not by law, but by sub-legislative decree, without parliamentary approval, and applies blanket limitations on millions of citizens based solely on age and sex, without individual assessment or due process.

 

Likewise, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees that:

 

“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”

Paragraph 3 allows for restrictions, but only if they are “in accordance with law” and “necessary in a democratic society” for reasons such as national security, public safety, or the rights of others. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly ruled that executive regulations alone do not meet the “in accordance with law” standard, particularly when they lack sufficient clarity, foreseeability, and democratic legitimacy.

 

The result is a legally unaccountable regime, in which executive rule replaces legislative authority, and individuals are left with no means of effective appeal or remedy—neither domestically, nor internationally. This deliberate circumvention of legal safeguards constitutes a violation of the rule of law and undermines the very foundations of constitutional democracy.

3.2. Political Repressions and Suppression of Rights

3.2.1. The closure of opposition media, banning of political parties, arrests of journalists, and persecution of religious organizations constitute a systematic attack on civil liberties.

3.2.2. Reports by international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), have documented cases of arbitrary detentions, suppression of dissent, and human rights violations in Ukraine. These reports confirm the existence of systematic repression against civilians, including forced mobilization, persecution of journalists, and restrictions on freedom of speech.

(Sources: Amnesty International, “Ukraine: ‘Anyone Can Die at Any Time’: Indiscriminate Attacks by Russian Forces in Kharkiv” (2022); OpenDemocracy: "Ukraine’s proposed new media law threatens press freedom" ; OHCHR: “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine” (2024).)


3.2.3. Segregation Among Ukraine’s Political and Military Elite 

Serious legal concerns arise from the actions of high-ranking Ukrainian officials who held office and were dismissed during the ongoing war.

General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces during the full-scale conflict, achieved no notable military victories, yet authored a book and defended a doctoral dissertation while in office. Dismissed during wartime under the pretext of health issues, he was immediately appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. This transition to a diplomatic post amidst hostilities may indicate abuse of power under Article 364 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and suggests an attempt to evade accountability for military leadership outcomes.

Notably, despite an ambiguous military record and controversial dismissal, Valerii Zaluzhnyi is now publicly promoted as a potential presidential candidate with considerable electoral support.

Similarly, Oleksii Reznikov, Minister of Defense during the war, was dismissed amid corruption scandals tied to inflated military procurement contracts and reportedly left the country.

Dmytro Kuleba, Foreign Minister during the conflict, was also removed and now lectures at a U.S. university.

None of these individuals -Zaluzhnyi, Reznikov, or Kuleba - were conscripted into the Armed Forces post-dismissal, despite being of eligible age and condition. Public data and investigations further reveal that the children of high-ranking officials are rarely, if ever, mobilized, highlighting entrenched legal inequality and structural privilege.
This inequality is exacerbated by selective exit permit policies.

Under Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 57 of January 27, 1995 (amended in 2022), men of conscription age are barred from leaving Ukraine, with exceptions outlined in Resolution No. 992 of September 2, 2022, under programs like “Path of the Artist” and “Way to Recovery.” These permit temporary travel for actors, musicians, athletes, and bankers—categories deemed “important for the state’s image” or “critical to the economy”- often based on internal directives, presidential decrees, or decisions by the Ministry of Culture and National Bank. 

Meanwhile, doctors, teachers, engineers, and scientists face strict travel bans, despite their critical societal roles. The opaque criteria for these exemptions, lacking clear national security justification, suggest informal lobbying and favoritism.

Additionally, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, and security service members are categorically exempt from conscription under internal regulations and classified “essential worker” lists. This creates a protected class shielded from military service, while ordinary citizens face forced mobilization under martial law.

The systemic nature of these disparities - where status, profession, or connections determine exposure to wartime obligations - constitutes institutional segregation.

These practices violate Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine, guaranteeing equality before the law, and Article 38, ensuring equal access to public service. Internationally, they contravene Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, ratified by Ukraine in 1973), prohibiting discrimination in legal protections and public functions. The absence of a formal declaration of war further enables this legal vacuum, allowing uneven treatment that would be harder to sustain under stricter wartime conditions. Selective conscription, elite immunity, unequal exit policies, and the suspension of elections collectively reflect a circumvention of constitutional order.

From a legal standpoint, these actions warrant independent investigation for potential abuse of office, corruption, discriminatory conscription enforcement, and violations of constitutional and international obligations.

3.3. Interethnic Tensions in Ukraine

Amid an already fragmented Ukrainian society—divided along ideological, linguistic, religious, and territorial lines—the government continues to deepen internal divisions by selectively reinforcing ethnic and religious distinctions through legislation and policy.

A particularly concerning aspect is the perceived policy of double standards, wherein certain minority groups are granted legal privileges while others with long-standing historical presence are excluded from similar recognition. This selective approach fuels public resentment and contributes to rising interethnic and interreligious tensions, not against any specific group, but as a reaction to the state’s perceived manipulation of identity-based rights.

3.3.1. Legislative Preconditions for Inequality

• Law No. 1616-IX “On the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine” (July 1, 2021) officially recognized only the Karaites, Krymchaks, and Crimean Tatars as indigenous peoples, while excluding all other native ethnic groups of Ukraine.

It is important to note that the law defines the recognized indigenous groups—Karaites, Krymchaks, and Crimean Tatars—specifically in relation to Crimea, a region that was under the de facto control of the Russian Federation at the time of the law’s adoption. Nevertheless, these groups were granted indigenous status across the entire territory of Ukraine, while larger ethnic communities with deep historical roots in the western, central, and eastern regions—such as Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Hutsuls, Boykos, Lemkos, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and others—were excluded.

Under the definition provided in Law No. 1616-IX, “indigenous peoples of Ukraine” are ethnic communities that do not have their own state formations outside the territory of Ukraine. This legal criterion may formally justify the exclusion of groups such as Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, all of whom possess recognized nation-states beyond Ukraine’s borders. However, this rationale does not explain the omission of distinct ethnocultural communities that have no statehood elsewhere and whose historical presence is rooted exclusively within Ukrainian territory—such as Ukrainians, Hutsuls, Boykos, Lemkos, and Rusyns. These groups meet the legal definition of indigenous peoples, yet they were excluded from recognition under the law. This selective omission raises legitimate concerns about ethnic discrimination and suggests that the legislative framework may have been applied inconsistently or with political bias.

According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, only around 1,196 Karaites lived in Ukraine (671 in Crimea). At the same time, various estimates indicate that between 30,000 and 50,000 Karaites reside in Israel, with a smaller number living in other countries. This raises serious questions about the territorial and demographic justification of the law. In effect, the law legitimizes the indigenous status of the entire global Karaite diaspora within the Ukrainian legal framework, despite their minimal presence on the territory of Ukraine itself. As a result, the law appears not only discriminatory in its selectivity but also legally absurd due to its extraterritorial implications.

In Karaite religious doctrine (Dr. Mikhail Kizilov) , it is a sin to count or disclose the number of community members without divine sanction. This belief is based on biblical prohibitions, including narratives from the Book of Exodus and the account of King David’s census, which led to divine punishment. Consequently, Karaites refrain from participating in population censuses or official demographic registration, viewing such acts as violations of sacred law. This religious injunction, combined with historical experiences of assimilation and persecution, contributes to the deliberate underreporting or concealment of their identity.

Consequently, the actual number of Karaites may be significantly higher than official records suggest, yet their faith and tradition prevent them from confirming it numerically. This creates a legal paradox: officially, their presence is nearly negligible, but they have been granted the status of an “indigenous people,” including in territories where they have never existed in large numbers. At the same time, other ethnocultural groups—without such religious taboos and openly asserting their identity—were excluded from the law.

Although officially framed as a gesture of protection toward a small ethnic group, the adoption of Law No. 1616-IX just six months before the war raises serious questions about its underlying purpose. By granting indigenous status to a group with only around 671 residents in Crimea—but potentially tens of thousands more abroad, whose numbers are deliberately concealed due to religious prohibitions—the Ukrainian state effectively legitimized an undefined and unquantifiable population across the entire territory of Ukraine. Given that the Karaite tradition forbids participation in censuses and the public disclosure of community size, the law introduces a legal paradox: it grants privileged status to an ethno-religious group whose demographic presence cannot be verified. In this context, the law may be interpreted not as a benign recognition, but as a calculated legal mechanism that enables a future redefinition of territorial, cultural, and political claims under the pretext of minority rights—raising concerns about sovereignty and prewar strategic planning.

 

Draft Law No. 11469, “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Ensuring the Right to Acquire and Retain Ukrainian Citizenship,” registered on August 7, 2024 and adopted as a basis on December 17, 2024, introduces simplified naturalization procedures for selected groups, including those classified as indigenous peoples. Submitted as an urgent initiative by President Volodymyr Zelensky, the bill—together with the earlier Law on Indigenous Peoples (No. 1616-IX), also initiated by Zelensky—reflects a broader legislative trend perceived by many as politically motivated.

This selective recognition establishes a clear precedent of legislative discrimination, as it enshrines unequal treatment based on ethnicity into national law. It directly contradicts Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnicity.

 

This created an imbalance, as at the same time:

• Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 57 of January 27, 1995 (amended in 2022) effectively prohibited men aged 18 to 60 from leaving the country.

• Mobilization applies to all Ukrainian citizens without exception.

• Evasion of mobilization has been criminalized (Article 336 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

As a result, there is a growing perception within Ukrainian society that, while ordinary citizens are being sent to what many consider a senseless death — with no clear tactical or strategic purpose — the state is simultaneously liberalizing access to citizenship for selected groups. This contrast appears suspicious and morally dissonant, fueling widespread frustration and indignation among the population.

 

3.3.2. Selective Application of Restrictions

Against the backdrop of restrictions affecting the majority of the population, the Ukrainian authorities have allowed exceptions for certain groups, which contributes to growing public tension.

• In 2022 and 2023, menorahs were installed on Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv in honor of Hanukkah, while Orthodox religious processions, other mass gatherings, and even school graduation ceremonies remained prohibited.

• In 2022, around 23,000 Hasidic Jews arrived in Uman; in 2023 — approximately 35,000; and in 2024 — about 32,000. These mass pilgrimages were officially permitted by Ukrainian authorities, despite the ongoing state of martial law and a nationwide ban on large public gatherings. Uman is a city in central Ukraine that holds religious significance for followers of Hasidic Judaism, as it is the burial site of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov (1772–1810), a revered spiritual leader.

Each year, tens of thousands of Hasidic Jews from around the world travel to Uman to mark Rosh Hashanah—the Jewish New Year—through prayer and pilgrimage. Despite wartime restrictions and prohibitions on public assemblies for Ukrainian citizens, the Ukrainian government made an exception for this religious event, reinforcing perceptions of unequal treatment and selective enforcement of martial law provisions.

Formally, such decisions may be justified by diplomatic and international obligations. However, against the backdrop of the general ban on public gatherings, they create a strong sense of injustice and double standards among the population.

• At the same time, all forms of public protest, including anti-war demonstrations and speeches against mobilization, were banned.

• Orthodox churches have been closed, and clergy have faced criminal prosecution.

• The official date of Christmas celebration was changed from January 7 to December 25 through expedited parliamentary procedure, which is perceived as an attack on the religious identity of the majority population.

 

3.3.4. Marginal Narratives and Their Societal Impact

Additional public frustration is caused by the circulation of marginal theories on social media that link the southern regions of Ukraine with the so-called “Heavenly Jerusalem” project.

• Videos featuring public activist Ihor Berkut, who in 2017 publicly presented the Ukrainian public with the concept of the “Heavenly Jerusalem” or “New Israel” project, remain accessible and continue to gain millions of views on platforms like YouTube and TikTok.

• In his statements, Berkut explicitly asserts that the implementation of this plan would require large-scale “cleansing” of the territory - a term that, in the public consciousness, is interpreted as the deliberate removal or destruction of the local population.

Despite its marginal nature and resemblance to disinformation, neither Ukraine nor Israel has officially refuted the theory. Meanwhile, Ukrainian authorities, who tightly control the information space under martial law, do not restrict its spread, instead blocking opposition media and bloggers.

This inaction raises questions. By ignoring narratives that sow fear and mistrust, the state condemns people to anxiety and cognitive dissonance, amplifying stress and apathy. Under Article 3 of the ECHR, authorities must protect citizens from psychological harm, yet in wartime, when society is most vulnerable, they fail to do so.

The authorities’ silence, despite their ability to suppress other content, deepens the atmosphere of helplessness and despair, eroding trust. This may violate human rights, exacerbating the repression and exhaustion detailed in the report.

 

3.4. International Complicity

3.4.1. Unconditional financial assistance from the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other supporting states directly sustains the repressive apparatus, making donors complicit in crimes.

3.4.2. The governments of Poland, Germany, and Estonia have made public statements suggesting the deportation of Ukrainian men of conscription age, despite the clear risk of forced mobilization upon return. This violates the principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and could constitute complicity in crimes against humanity.

3.4.3. Ukrainian consular services abroad systematically refuse to renew passports for men aged 18-60 unless they register for military service. This coercive practice effectively forces them to return to Ukraine, exposing them to forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, or persecution, in violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (right to private and family life).

3.4.4. Russia has implemented restrictive border policies against Ukrainian citizens, limiting their entry to designated checkpoints, conducting security screenings, inspecting personal devices, and interrogating individuals about their military affiliations. This practice, particularly targeting military-aged men, contributes to systematic persecution and potential violations of Article II(b) and (c) of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.

3.4.5. The European Union and several of its member states have provided financial, logistical, and intelligence support to Ukraine’s Military Recruitment Centers, Security Service, and law enforcement agencies, despite documented human rights violations. The absence of conditionality or oversight in this funding raises legal questions under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute regarding complicity in international crimes.

3.5. Suspension of Presidential Elections and Loss of Legitimacy

3.5.1. On December 8, 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly announced that presidential elections would not be held in 2024 due to the ongoing conflict, despite the fact that no official state of war has been declared by the Verkhovna Rada, as required under Article 85 (Clause 9) of the Constitution of Ukraine.

3.5.2. The refusal to conduct elections, while simultaneously continuing large-scale military operations and forced conscription, creates a legal contradiction where the Ukrainian government exercises emergency wartime powers without the formal legal basis of a declared war.

3.5.3. The indefinite suspension of democratic processes violates Article 5 and Article 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which establish that the President’s term is strictly limited to five years and that a new election must be held upon expiration. By remaining in office beyond the legal mandate without electoral confirmation, Zelensky lacks constitutional legitimacy.

3.5.4. Given that the legitimacy of any government is a fundamental principle of international law, as recognized by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) and UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970) on the Principles of International Law, any agreements, mobilization orders, and international treaties signed by the current Ukrainian leadership may be deemed null and void due to lack of legitimate authority.

3.5.5. Treason Through the Refusal to Declare a State of War

The President of Ukraine has deliberately refrained from declaring a state of war, an act that may constitute treason under Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. This provision defines treason as an intentional act by a citizen that harms the sovereignty, territorial integrity, defense capability, or security of the state, including assistance to foreign entities in subversive activities against Ukraine.

The failure to declare war, despite ongoing armed conflict, undermines the legal basis for national defense. It contravenes Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law,” which establishes martial law as a special regime in response to armed aggression or threats to sovereignty. However, martial law is not equivalent to a formal state of war and does not trigger the full range of constitutional and international safeguards.

Consequently, Ukraine is denied its legal right to demand military assistance under the Budapest Memorandum (1994), while mass mobilization proceeds without affording servicemen the protections and rights mandated in wartime. This refusal may suggest alignment with external interests, meeting the legal threshold for treason under Ukrainian law.

3.5.6. Treason only when it’s Russia

In Ukrainian law enforcement practice, the concepts of “treason” and “collaborationism” are narrowly and selectively interpreted, limited exclusively to contacts with the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, political, military, and symbolic dependence on NATO countries is not only unquestioned but officially encouraged as “friendly cooperation.”

Ukrainian servicemen widely wear patches bearing the flags of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other foreign states, while German “Leopard” tanks supplied as military aid often operate on Ukrainian territory with original Bundeswehr black crosses, without replacement by Ukrainian national symbols. These facts are not merely normalized but actively supported by official rhetoric, which directly contradicts Article 1 of the Constitution of Ukraine, declaring Ukraine a sovereign state, and Article 17, which obliges the government to protect independence and prevent the subordination of the Armed Forces to foreign interests. Moreover, such use of foreign insignia violates Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” which requires clear identification of military units under national emblems.

This approach also conflicts with Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which defines as treason any assistance to a foreign state to the detriment of Ukrainian sovereignty, and Article 436-1, which prohibits the public use of symbols promoting foreign influence. However, these norms are enforced exclusively in the context of cooperation with Russia, while similar actions involving NATO countries remain beyond the scope of legal scrutiny. This violates Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which guarantees equality before the law, and creates a legal absurdity: treason is recognized only in relation to one state, while dependency on others is elevated to virtue.

At the international level, this practice contradicts Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which requires states to refrain from actions undermining their own sovereignty, and Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), which obligates armed forces to clearly identify their national affiliation. The effective erosion of national identity under the guise of “alliance” reinforces the Russian propaganda narrative that portrays Ukraine as a tool of NATO rather than an independent actor, thereby indirectly justifying Russian aggression.

This politically motivated definition of “treason” and “loyalty” replaces the protection of national interests with external governance, turning criminal prosecution into an instrument of repression against dissenters. Such a policy not only undermines the legitimacy of the authorities but also calls into question their ability to act as a sovereign representative of the Ukrainian people, as required by Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Rather than strengthening independence, this approach makes Ukraine a hostage to geopolitical games in which its own sovereignty is sacrificed to selective allegiance.

3.5.7. Omission of the Word “Republic” in Official Documents

Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine states: “Ukraine is a republic. The people are the bearers of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine…”

The term “republic” is absent from official documents and administrative practice.

 • Judicial decisions are issued “In the name of Ukraine”.

 • Public institutions are named “President of Ukraine,” “Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,” “Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,” “National Police of Ukraine,” “Ministry of Defense of Ukraine,” and “Security Service of Ukraine”.

 • Contracts, deeds, powers of attorney, and registration documents are executed under the name “Ukraine”.

 • Notaries refuse requests from individuals to include the term “republic” in legal documents, citing standard templates.

 • Citizens discuss the absence of the word “republic” in official documents on social media and in public statements.

 • People raise questions about the legal framework in conversations and online forums.

The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania includes the term “republic” in titles such as “Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania” and in judicial decisions issued “in the name of the Republic of Lithuania”. The Constitution of Poland uses the term “Republic of Poland” in documents, including “Sejm of the Republic of Poland” and “Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland”.

Some citizens in Ukraine mention questions about the legal subjectivity of these practices in public discussions.

3.5.8. Peculiarities of Ukraine’s International Legal Personality

Ukraine joined the United Nations on October 24, 1945, as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Ukrainian SSR changed its name to “Ukraine”. Ukraine retained its seat in the United Nations without submitting a new application for membership. No treaty or declaration establishing Ukraine as a new international subject was registered with the United Nations after 1991.

The Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 26, 1991, following the Alma-Ata Protocol signed by Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. Russia assumed the Soviet Union’s seat in the United Nations as its successor state on December 24, 1991.

The Czech Republic, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, applied for United Nations membership as a new state and was admitted by General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/221 on April 19, 1993.Slovakia, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, applied for United Nations membership as a new state and was admitted by General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/222 on April 19, 1993.

3.6. Unlawful Use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Against Civilians

3.6.1. The Constitution of Ukraine explicitly prohibits the use of the Armed Forces against its own citizens. Under Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine “shall not be used to restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens” and are strictly designated for the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3.6.2. Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCC), known as “ТЦК” in Ukrainian, operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense and are staffed by personnel wearing Ukrainian military uniforms, making them functionally indistinguishable from the Armed Forces. Despite their administrative classification, their role in conducting forced recruitment, detentions, and physical violence against civilians places them in direct violation of Article 17 of the Ukrainian Constitution.

3.6.3. The deployment of military personnel and military-affiliated units for law enforcement functions—including forced conscription raids, street detentions, and forced removals of civilians—constitutes an illegal militarization of civilian life, creating widespread fear and repression among the population.

3.6.4. Furthermore, these actions discredit the Armed Forces of Ukraine by associating military personnel with arbitrary detentions, coercion, and abuse of civilians. The public perception of the military as an instrument of repression, rather than national defense, erodes trust in the institution and damages Ukraine’s international reputation.

3.6.5. Organized Terror by Military Recruitment Centers (TRC) Against Civilians

The transformation of Territorial Recruitment Centers (TRC) into punitive structures that use violent methods to coerce citizens into military service constitutes a form of state terror. Article 8, paragraph 7 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” allows the introduction of labor duties for able-bodied persons. However, the use of physical violence, abductions, and forced detentions by TCCs exceeds the legally established measures and is conducted outside the framework of judicial oversight. Millions of Ukrainian men are effectively under house arrest, as any public appearance may lead to forced detention and conscription.

These actions violate Articles 9 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and contribute to the establishment of a systematic mechanism of repression against civilians.

 

3.7. Systematic Deportation and Persecution of Ukrainian Men of Conscription Age

3.7.1. The coordinated policies of multiple European countries, including Poland, Germany, and Estonia, in deporting Ukrainian men of conscription age back to Ukraine despite the risks of forced mobilization violate the principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

3.7.2. Ukrainian men abroad face systematic denial of legal status, work permits, and access to asylum procedures. This is documented in reports by human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and the UNHCR.

3.7.3. The refusal of European states to grant temporary protection status or political asylum to Ukrainian men at risk of forced conscription may constitute complicity in crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

 

4. Violations of International Law

4.1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)

4.1.1. Article II(c): Creating conditions calculated to physically destroy part of the population (selective conscription without a declared state of war).

4.1.2. Article III(b): Complicity through the financing of repressive policies.

4.1.3. Economic Destruction of Citizens Under Martial Law

The absence of a declared state of war while imposing martial law forces Ukrainian citizens to bear financial obligations incompatible with wartime conditions. Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” outlines measures that may be implemented under martial law, including labor duties for able-bodied persons. However, the law does not exempt citizens from financial obligations such as paying utilities, taxes, and bank loans, obligations that remain in place despite economic collapse and lack of income. Unlike a formally declared state of war, which would provide mechanisms for suspending or restructuring economic obligations, martial law in Ukraine allows for continued enforcement of financial burdens on the population. As a result, citizens face systematic economic destruction, which may meet the criteria of genocide as defined in Article II(c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

4.1.4. The financial burden imposed on Ukrainian civilians under martial law creates conditions that may qualify as “deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction” under Article II(c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Despite widespread economic collapse, Ukrainian citizens remain obligated to pay taxes, utility bills, and loan repayments. Unlike in other wartime scenarios where governments provide financial relief to affected civilians, the Ukrainian government has continued enforcing financial obligations without offering adequate social protections, pushing large segments of the population into extreme poverty.

4.1.5. Ethnic Targeting and Demographic Destruction

4.1.5.1.The systematic targeting of a specific demographic group—Ukrainian men of conscription age—constitutes a violation of the principle of equal protection under international law. The disproportionate application of conscription laws, the denial of legal protection abroad, and restrictions on movement meet the criteria of “ethnic targeting”, as established in past cases before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

4.1.5.2. By systematically depriving Ukrainian men of their ability to leave the country, obtain asylum, or legally work abroad, the Ukrainian government, with the tacit cooperation of donor states, has created conditions amounting to “deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction,” as per Article II(c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

 

4.2. European Convention on Human Rights (1950)

4.2.1. Article 4: Prohibition of forced labor (illegal military service).

4.2.2. Article 5: Arbitrary deprivation of liberty (detention in the army without legal grounds).

 

4.3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

4.3.1. Article 8: Prohibition of forced labor in the absence of war or a state of emergency.

4.3.2. Article 9: Protection against arbitrary detention.

 

4.4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)

4.4.1. Article 6 (Genocide): Selective conscription as part of a policy of destruction targeting specific groups.

4.4.2. Article 7 (Crimes Against Humanity): Large-scale and systematic attack on the civilian population, including deprivation of liberty and repression.


4.4.3. Selective Impunity Through Ratification as a Tool of Repression

Ukraine ratified the Rome Statute on August 20, 2024 (Law №3909-IX), with an Article 124 declaration, excluding ICC jurisdiction over war crimes committed by its nationals for seven years. This deliberate exemption shields internal actors—such as Territorial Recruitment Centers (TRC) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)—from accountability for documented abuses, including forced conscription, abductions, and extrajudicial measures (Sections 3.1 and 3.6). Ukraine’s duplicity is evident in its selective application of the Statute: while recognizing ICC jurisdiction for Russian crimes since 2014 via Article 12(3) declarations, it denies the same scrutiny for its own actions, ensuring impunity for domestic repressors. By enabling systematic repression, particularly targeting men of conscription age (Section 4.1.5), while receiving unconditional international funding (Section 5), Ukraine creates a legal vacuum that violates Article 7 of the Rome Statute (crimes against humanity) and aligns with Article II(c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention, as it contributes to “deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction” of a specific demographic group through sustained coercion and denial of legal protection.

4.5. European Convention on Human Rights (1950)

4.5.1. Article 3: The psychological pressure exerted on Ukrainian men by denying them the ability to renew passports abroad, effectively forcing them to return to Ukraine where they face forced recruitment, constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment.

4.5.2. Article 8: The inability to obtain travel documents due to Ukraine’s restrictive passport policies violates the right to private and family life, as it prevents individuals from maintaining connections with their families abroad.

4.5.3. The systematic denial of travel documents to Ukrainian men abroad, effectively preventing them from seeking asylum or legal protection in third countries, violates Article 2 (Right to Freedom of Movement) of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR.

4.5.4. The coordinated pressure by Ukrainian, European, and Russian authorities to either restrict the movement of Ukrainian citizens or force them into compliance with conscription policies may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR.

4.6. Suspension of Elections as a Violation of Democratic Governance and State Legitimacy

4.6.1. The Ukrainian government’s refusal to conduct elections, while simultaneously exercising unrestricted executive and military powers, constitutes a violation of Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), which guarantees the right to free elections.

4.6.2. Under Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, legitimacy of a government derives solely from the will of the people, expressed in periodic and genuine elections. The unilateral cancellation of elections in Ukraine, combined with ongoing forced mobilization, suppression of dissent, and elimination of opposition parties, establishes a de facto autocratic rule without democratic legitimacy.

4.6.3. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, Protocol 1, Article 3) obligates member states to hold free elections at reasonable intervals. Ukraine, as a signatory state, has violated this obligation, further undermining its constitutional and international legitimacy.

4.6.4. The absence of electoral legitimacy directly affects the legality of military conscription, as military service obligations are imposed by a government whose legal authority is disputed. Under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, forced labor is prohibited unless it is “lawfully imposed.” The absence of a declared state of war and the indefinite extension of presidential authority invalidate the legal basis for mandatory conscription, rendering it a violation of fundamental human rights.

 

4.7. Violation of Constitutional and International Protections Against the Militarization of Civilian Law Enforcement

4.7.1. Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly prohibits the use of the Armed Forces for restricting civil rights and freedoms. The involvement of military personnel, wearing military uniforms, and operating under the Ministry of Defense, in the forced recruitment and detention of civilians constitutes a direct violation of this constitutional provision.

4.7.2. Under Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), no individual may be deprived of liberty arbitrarily. The forced detention of civilians by military personnel without a legal basis violates the fundamental right to security and freedom.

4.7.3. The use of military forces against civilians also contradicts the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990), which state that law enforcement should be carried out by civilian police forces, not military personnel, except under strict emergency conditions—which Ukraine has not formally declared.

4.7.4. The militarization of law enforcement and forced conscription also violates Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. The use of military personnel in a law enforcement capacity to enforce forced conscription creates a climate of fear, intimidation, and coercion that meets the threshold of degrading treatment under international law.

4.8. Refusal to Declare a State of War as an Instrument of External Control and Possible Treason

The Ukrainian government’s consistent refusal to officially declare a state of war, despite the ongoing armed conflict and widespread mobilization, cannot be viewed as a mere political oversight. It must be assessed in light of its legal consequences, particularly regarding the country’s international financial obligations and its capacity to assert sovereign rights under wartime conditions.

Under international law, a formally declared state of war or martial emergency may serve as a legal foundation for invoking force majeure or the doctrine of state necessity — both of which allow a country to temporarily suspend the fulfillment of certain international obligations, such as sovereign debt payments, without breaching international treaties or exposing itself to litigation.

In accordance with the UN Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001) and precedents in international practice, an official state of war:

 • Establishes that the state is operating under extraordinary conditions beyond its control;

 • Allows it to seek debt restructuring, payment moratoriums, or legal protection from creditors through recognized international mechanisms;

 • Provides a basis to assert sovereign necessity, prioritizing national survival and civilian well-being over commercial obligations.

By avoiding a declaration of war, the Ukrainian government chose to preserve its legal and financial obligations toward international lenders, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and private bondholders, even while enforcing military mobilization, suppressing democratic processes, and functioning under de facto wartime conditions.

As a result:

 • Ukrainian citizens continued to bear the full burden of tax obligations, utility bills, and debt servicing, despite massive displacement, economic collapse, and martial restrictions on economic activity.

 • Ukraine continued servicing IMF and foreign debts, redirecting state funds toward interest payments, while basic social guarantees were cut or suspended.

 • Trade with the Russian Federation, including critical commodities such as minerals and fuel, reportedly continued throughout the conflict — further eroding the narrative of a “total war for survival.”

This legal ambiguity — mobilizing the population as though under wartime law while maintaining peace-time obligations to foreign creditors — raises legitimate concerns regarding the true beneficiaries of Ukraine’s undeclared legal status. It enabled the continuation of international financing flows while transferring the cost of war exclusively onto the Ukrainian population.

The refusal to declare a state of war thus served not the interests of Ukrainian sovereignty or citizen protection, but rather the interests of foreign financial institutions and geopolitical actors who sought stability of debt repayment and resource access under the cover of war.

In legal terms, such a policy may be evaluated under Article 111 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which defines treason as “an act committed by an official to the detriment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, defense capability, or security of the state.”

Failing to invoke wartime legal protections, while deliberately subjecting the population to coercive mobilization, financial burden, and legal vulnerability — in favor of continued compliance with foreign financial demands — constitutes a dereliction of duty at the highest level of constitutional responsibility.

In this light, the undeclared nature of the war in Ukraine must be seen not as a legal accident, but as a deliberate policy that facilitated both internal repression and external control, and may amount to a betrayal of national interest in favor of foreign influence.

 

5. International Complicity Through Unconditional Funding

5.1. Facts

5.1.1. Since 2022, the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have allocated more than $200 billion to Ukraine (according to data from the IMF and the World Bank), a significant portion of which has been directed to the budget without oversight.

5.1.2. According to official reports from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the European Commission, Ukraine has received over $200 billion in financial assistance from Western states and international financial institutions since 2022. The European Commission’s official statement on financial aid to Ukraine (December 2023) confirmed that more than €85 billion had been provided in direct budgetary support, with an additional $75 billion from the United States. The lack of transparency and accountability regarding the allocation of these funds raises serious concerns about their use in supporting repressive institutions, including Military Recruitment Centers, the Security Service of Ukraine, and law enforcement structures engaged in forced mobilization and human rights violations.

5.1.3. Since 2022, financial assistance from the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada has been funneled into Ukraine’s general state budget, which includes funding for military recruitment, law enforcement, and intelligence operations that have engaged in forced mobilization and arbitrary detentions. The lack of financial transparency and accountability mechanisms violates the obligation of donor states under Article 16 of the UN Draft Articles on State Responsibility.

5.1.4. The allocation of foreign aid to Ukrainian institutions involved in the forced conscription of civilians, suppression of political dissent, and human rights abuses creates a direct link between international financial support and the commission of crimes under international law. This necessitates an immediate review of these funding mechanisms under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute.

5.1.5. International Financing of Economic and Military Terror

Funds allocated to Ukraine by international donors are not only used for military expenses but also to maintain a system of economic and physical coercion of citizens. International funding is directed toward supporting military recruitment centers (TCC), the police, and the Security Service of Ukraine, which engage in forced conscription and violent detentions. Unconditional financing of Ukraine’s economy by international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, is used to service external debts and maintain loan repayments, preserving the system of economic exploitation of citizens. 

5.1.6. The Weight of Witnesses: Donor States' Inescapable Complicity  

The reality is simple: millions of Ukrainian refugees now reside within the legal jurisdictions of the very states funding their persecutors. This alone creates an undeniable legal liability.  

The Core Argument  

5.1.6.1. More Than Four Million Witnesses  

   - They do not need to file formal asylum claims. Their mere presence—their lived experience—constitutes evidence.  

   - Under international law (ICJ Bosnia v. Serbia), states cannot claim ignorance when victims are physically within their borders.  

5.1.6.2. The Legal Standard of "Knew or Should Have Known"  

   - If a single victim testifies, it is a case.  

   - If thousands testify identically, it is a system.  

   - If millions exist as potential witnesses, it is common knowledge.  

5.1.6.3. The Silence of Donor States  

   - They continue funding, despite:  

     - Open discussions among refugees about repression.  

     - Media reports, social networks, protests—all within their own territories.  

     - The sheer statistical inevitability that any random Ukrainian refugee can confirm these patterns.  

Why This Matters Legally  

- Rome Statute, Art. 25(3)(c):  

  "A person aids a crime by enabling it—financially, logistically, or through willful blindness."  
- ICJ Bosnia v. Serbia (2007):  

  "States must act when violations are so widespread that they become impossible to ignore."
 

The Unavoidable Conclusion  

Donor states do not need spreadsheets to understand what is happening. They have the people themselves — in their cities, their courts, their shelters. That is the evidence.  

By continuing to fund Ukraine uncotionalbe, and no control while hosting its victims, these states are not just negligent—they are complicit under the clearest standards of international law.  

5.1.7. Public Statements Revealing the True Nature of Foreign Aid

U.S. President Joe Biden publicly stated, “Doc, we’re going to fight to the last Ukrainian,” a phrase that sparked controversy and was interpreted by many as a reflection of Washington’s willingness to prolong the war at Ukraine’s expense.

In another official statement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted that 90% of the military aid provided to Ukraine remains in the United States, funding American defense contractors and arms manufacturers.
Furthermore, current President Donald Trump reportedly demands 50% of Ukraine’s rare earth mineral resources in exchange for continued military support, exposing the economic motivations behind Western involvement.

More recently, negotiations have emerged around the possible transfer of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants to U.S. companies in return for continued assistance - raising the question: what exactly is left of national sovereignty?

Together, these facts suggest that foreign aid is not a gift but a transactional arrangement rooted in long-term economic control and resource extraction.


5.1.8. Misleading Media Language and Hidden Loan Conditions

Throughout the war, Ukrainian and Western media have consistently used terms such as “aid,” “support,” “allocation,” and “provision” - while avoiding any mention of the financial structure of these agreements. The public was led to believe that Ukraine was receiving unconditional help, while in reality much of the support was provided in the form of loans, often with interest, and tied to specific conditions.

At the same time, Ukrainians - including refugees - were frequently stigmatized in host countries as living off taxpayers’ money, despite the fact that the financial aid to Ukraine was often structured to benefit donor economies and corporations. This deliberate obfuscation created a narrative of dependency and entitlement, while hiding the exploitative and commercial character of the so-called “assistance.”

 

5.2. Legal Basis

5.2.1. Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute: Aiding and abetting crimes through the provision of financial resources.

5.2.2. Precedent: Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998) — financial support of genocide constitutes complicity.

5.2.3. Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute:
Providing financial resources to entities directly engaged in forced conscription and arbitrary detentions constitutes aiding and abetting crimes. The unrestricted funding of Ukraine’s security and military institutions by Western donors enables these actions.

5.2.4. Precedent: Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998)
Financial support of a regime engaged in forced mobilization and suppression of civil liberties has previously been deemed complicity in international crimes. The lack of oversight in Ukraine’s use of foreign aid raises similar concerns.

5.2.5. Precedent: Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (ICTY, 2001)
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found that targeting a specific demographic group for persecution, forced displacement, and systematic violence can constitute genocide under Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

5.2.6. The case of Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić confirmed that indirect methods of demographic destruction—such as forced displacement, coercive conscription, and economic destruction—can meet the legal threshold for genocide.

5.2.6. Legal Implications of Resource-for-Aid Demands

The transactional nature of military assistance, including demands for resource access and strategic infrastructure control (such as rare earth minerals and nuclear power plants), may constitute coercion under international law. When financial or military aid is conditioned on the transfer of sovereign assets, it raises questions about consent, exploitation, and unequal bargaining power - all of which are relevant under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These practices also risk violating the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, affirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII).

6. Conclusion: Indicators of Genocide and International Responsibility

The facts presented in this document do not merely reflect a legal crisis — they demonstrate a combination of elements that fall under the legal definition of genocide, as established by the 1948 UN Convention.

Forced conscription without an officially declared state of war is not being conducted as a universal national defense effort, but rather as a selective and coercive campaign targeting specific categories of citizens — primarily men of military age, especially from vulnerable social groups. There are no legal options for conscientious objection, medical conditions are routinely disregarded, and attempts to avoid conscription are criminalized.

This approach creates a legally dangerous precedent in which coercive state action is applied based on gender, age, geographic location, or social status. Such practices may qualify as the creation of conditions calculated to bring about the partial physical destruction of a group, as defined in Article II(c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Another critical indication that the primary objective of the conflict is not military victory but demographic destruction lies in the strategic choices made by the Russian Federation. It does not require the expertise of a general to understand that cutting off a nation’s supply chains is a basic principle of modern warfare. With direct access to Ukraine’s western corridor via Belarus - through which the invasion of Kyiv was initially launched — Russian forces could have, within days, severed the country’s only functional logistics route for foreign military aid, equipment, and humanitarian support. However, this was never attempted.

Despite having the capacity to advance from Brest to Mukachevo and encircle the entire supply network, Russian troops refrained from targeting this corridor.

This omission cannot be explained by military oversight or lack of capacity. Instead, it suggests that the continuation of war - not its swift conclusion - was the intended outcome. By allowing uninterrupted arms deliveries while simultaneously engaging in sustained bombardments, mobilizations, and repression, the situation resembles a managed conflict whose true aim is the gradual collapse of civil society and mass depopulation. Such a pattern reinforces the conclusion that the war’s design was not territorial conquest, but the engineered destruction of the Ukrainian population, consistent with the legal definition of genocide under Article II(c) of the 1948 Convention.

Another important indicator of the systemic nature of this destruction can be found in official statements made by Ukraine’s own top military leadership. On May 19, 2023, during a public address at the National University “Odesa Law Academy,” General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, then the serving Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, publicly expressed concern about the need to regulate criminal liability for actions committed by military personnel during combat missions.

He stated:

“…I am personally concerned that we should have a full set of legal acts regulating the application of combat immunity during the performance of military tasks by servicemen in the course of operations - so that servicemen could not be held accountable for certain crimes committed during combat missions.”

Since all combat operations take place in Ukrainian territory, the question arises: against which citizens were these crimes committed? Were they committed against Ukrainian civilians, prisoners of war, or even Ukrainian military personnel themselves? And why did the Commander-in-Chief seek their decriminalization?

This appeal, coming from the highest-ranking military officer, suggests an attempt to institutionalize impunity for potential war crimes, directly contradicting Article 8 of the Rome Statute. In the broader context of this report - documenting the erosion of legal safeguards, suppression of rights, and normalization of repression - this proposal reinforces concerns that the destruction of Ukraine’s population is a managed process, not only through external aggression but also through domestic policy. The systematic removal of legal accountability for crimes committed in combat conditions, when all military operations take place on national territory, may qualify as the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, as defined under Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention.

Even the Kursk operation - conducted on Russian territory after Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal—lacked legal status, raising doubts about whether this ambiguity was intentional. By sending troops without formal recognition or protection, the Ukrainian government exposed its own soldiers to legal uncertainty and framed their actions as illegitimate under international law. This ambiguity served not defense, but internal attrition.

For months, Ukrainian servicemen remained in Russia without a declared war or legal mandate. Putin called them terrorists, Trump pleaded for their lives, confirming their total vulnerability. These conditions may fall under Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention as deliberate exposure to destruction, making the Kursk operation further evidence of systemic genocide.

When viewed alongside Russia’s deliberate decision not to sever Ukraine’s western supply corridors and the international community’s passive complicity, this forms a picture of managed destruction.

In this context, the silence of international institutions, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), is particularly alarming. This same court has already issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu for actions determined to contain elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

This raises a legitimate question: why are the same legal mechanisms not being applied in Ukraine, despite the existence of well-documented evidence reported by international human rights organizations?

It is understood that ICC decisions are often influenced by political realities. However, if international law truly exists, it must be applied universally, not selectively.

A state that has not declared a state of war, but enforces compulsory mobilization, cancels elections, bans opposition parties, suppresses dissent, and still receives unconditional international funding - cannot be considered a democracy but rather a regime that systematically violates fundamental human rights and international law.

We continue to hope that international institutions, including the ICC, will recognize that large-scale conscription campaigns based on selective criteria may qualify as an element of genocide, particularly when accompanied by the absence of civilian service alternatives, restrictions on international movement, and the denial of legal protections.

 

 

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The author unequivocally condemns the aggression and occupation by the Russian Federation, recognizing them as an undeniable violation of international law. The absence of emphasis on this aspect in the text should not be misinterpreted as justification or support, but rather reflects the fact that this violation is widely acknowledged by the international community. The purpose of this document is to highlight another critical, yet less publicly addressed, dimension of the conflict—systematic human rights abuses and internal repression affecting Ukrainian citizens.

Any attempt to use this document for propaganda purposes - whether by the Russian Federation or any other political entity - constitutes a deliberate misrepresentation of its intent. The author categorically rejects any efforts to distort its content to serve geopolitical agendas.

This document is a legal analysis based on constitutional and international law, supported by verifiable evidence. It is not a political statement, ideological argument, or an emotional narrative. Please refrain from conflating law, morality, and geopolitics when engaging with its content.